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Sequent Calculi for Process Verification:
Hennessy-Milner Logic for
an Arbitrary GSOS
Alex Simpson 1
LFCS, School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
Abstract
We argue that, by supporting a mixture of “compositional” and “structural” styles
of proof, sequent-based proof systems provide a useful framework for the formal
verification of processes. As a worked example, we present a sequent calculus for
establishing that processes from a process algebra satisfy assertions in Hennessy-
Milner logic. The main novelty lies in the use of the operational semantics to derive
introduction rules, on the left and right of sequents, for the operators of the process
calculus. This gives a generic proof system applicable to any process algebra with
an operational semantics specified in the GSOS format. Using a general algebraic
notion of GSOS model, we prove a completeness theorem for the cut-free fragment
of the proof system, thereby establishing the admissibility of the cut rule. Under
mild (and necessary) conditions on the process algebra, an ω-completeness result,
relative to the “intended” model of closed process terms, follows.
Key words: Formal verification, Compositionality, Process algebra, Structural
operational semantics, Sequent calculus
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the construction of proof systems for the formal
verification of programs, specifically of concurrent processes. The main thesis
is that Gentzen’s sequent calculus [14] provides an ideal foundation upon which
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RIMS, Kyoto University (2002–2003).
Preprint submitted to Elsevier Science 15 September 2003
to base such systems. This is illustrated by a substantial worked example: a
sequent-based proof system for establishing that processes with operational
semantics specified in the GSOS format [5] satisfy properties of Hennessy-
Milner logic [16]. We end the paper with a discussion of how the approach
extends to other programming paradigms and to more powerful logics.
There are several desirable properties that one might require of any proof
system for program verification. First, concerning the basic logical properties
of the system:
Soundness: everything provable is true. We take this as the sine qua non of
formal verification.
Completeness: everything true is provable. For expressive programming lan-
guages and logics this will be unachievable. Nevertheless, it is vital that the
proof system is sufficiently complete to establish verification goals that occur
in practice. Moreover, informative restricted completeness theorems may be
available as a mathematical indication of the power of the system.
Of practical importance is that the proof system should permit useful methods
of reasoning. We identify three independent requirements here.
Compositional reasoning. Often, in order to verify that a compound pro-
gram satisfies a property, one would like to verify that its component subpro-
grams independently satisfy properties that are together sufficient to establish
the original goal. For example, to verify that a parallel composition p|q sat-
isfies a property A, one might verify that p satisfies some property B1 and
that q satisfies some property B2, where these two facts together imply that
p|q indeed satisfies A. The importance of such compositional reasoning is that
it allows the verification task to be split up into independent goals that can
be verified separately. This possibility provides a foundation for the modular
development and verification of software.
Structural reasoning. It should be possible to verify a goal by breaking the
goal down into subgoals obtained via a canonical decomposition of the original
goal based on its syntactic structure. Such structural methods support a nat-
ural goal-directed approach to proof construction. They are thus important in
the provision of proof support by proof assistants and theorem provers, and
especially vital to the efficient implementation of proof search algorithms.
Natural reasoning. In addition, one would like the proof system to support
natural and intuitive methods of reasoning. Ideally, it should be possible for a
formal proof of correctness to closely adhere to the natural informal argument
justifying correctness
We believe that it is important for a proof system to fulfill all three require-
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ments. Indeed, significant though compositional methods undoubtedly are,
there is no reason at all to require every proof step to be compositional. Com-
positionality should be used at natural points, where a program divides into
modules, and where the independent verification of these modules is desir-
able. But, within the verification of any individual module itself, it may well
be useful to maintain logical dependencies between subcomponents, and these
dependencies might be less easily expressed if compositional methods were
enforced throughout the verification process. Furthermore, there is no general
guarantee that compositional reasoning is always applicable. For example,
there is no reason for it to always be possible to reduce a goal “p|q satisfies
A” to two independent goals of the form “p satisfies B1” and “q satisfies B2”.
Thus, although it is essential for a proof system to support compositional
reasoning, this should not be the only method of verification permitted.
Finally, another general concern is that, preferably, the proof system should be
derived from the programming language and logic in a principled way. In such
cases there is better chance of being able to adapt or extend the system to
deal with new programming language features and different logical primitives.
We now present a very general argument that sequent calculus provides an
excellent foundation for the development of proof systems with the above
properties. Suppose we have a language for expressing processes (or programs),
and a logic for expressing properties of them. Then the basic relation of interest
is the satisfaction relation between processes and properties: process p satisfies
property A. We outline the potential virtues of having a proof system based on
sequents of the form Γ =⇒ ∆ where Γ and ∆ are sets of assertions, including a
basic assertion form, p :A, expressing the above satisfaction relation. As usual,
a sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ should be understood as expressing the implication: if all
the assertions in Γ are true then so is at least one of the assertions in ∆.
First, the sequent-based formalism is rich enough to express diverse types of
verification goal.
Ordinary goals. The ordinary verification goal, of establishing that process
p satisfies property A, is expressed by the sequent =⇒ p :A. The verification
task is then to construct a proof of this sequent.
Parametrized goals. By allowing variables ranging over processes in asser-
tions, one can express parametrized verification goals of the form
x1 :B1, . . . , xn :Bn =⇒ p(x1, . . . , xn) :A
This sequent states that if the parameters x1, . . . , xn in p are instantiated
with processes q1, . . . , qn satisfying B1, . . . , Bn respectively, then the resulting
compound process p(q1, . . . , qn) satisfies A.
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Further, sequent-calculus-based proof systems address the various stylistic re-
quirements concerning reasoning methods.
Compositional reasoning. Parametrized verification goals can be used to
support compositional reasoning. By combining the familiar cut and substi-
tution rules from sequent calculus, one obtains derived rules of the form
=⇒ q1 :B1 . . . =⇒ qn :Bn x1 :B1, . . . , xn :Bn =⇒ p(x1, . . . , xn) :A
=⇒ p(q1, . . . , qn) :A
The above rule reduces the goal of showing that a compound process p(q1, . . . , qn)
satisfies property A to individual subgoals for its component subprocesses
q1, . . . , qn, together with an additional parametrized goal required to justify
the choice of B1, . . . , Bn. This approach to compositionality was proposed by
Stirling in [25], who presented a proof calculus based on primitive decompo-
sition rules of this form for CCS parallel compositions q1|q2. In our approach,
such rules arise automatically as a consequence of having a sequent-based proof
system allowing the expression of general parametrized verification goals.
Structural reasoning. The primitive proof rules of sequent calculus are in-
troduction rules, on the left and right of sequents, for logical connectives.
Such proof rules exactly support a structural, goal-directed form of reasoning.
Moreover, if a cut-elimination theorem is available then structural reasoning
is sufficient for establishing any provable goal.
Natural reasoning. Each primitive proof rule of sequent calculus embodies
in a direct way the meaning of the logical connective that the rule represents.
This feature makes it plausible that natural informal proofs that a process
satisfies a property, whose primitive steps should all be self-explanatory, might
have close formal analogues. Indeed, a wide body of research, undertaken
using the many proof assistants based on sequent calculi, suggests that such
systems do allow direct formalizations of natural arguments, modulo the minor
convolution of writing proofs in a goal-directed sequent style, rather than in
a natural deduction style.
There is one major issue, however, that has not been addressed in the discus-
sion above. We have argued that the compositional, structural and naturalness
aspects of sequent-based proof follow from properties of the basic sequent
calculus rule set, including “structural rules” 2 (e.g. cut) and logical rules.
2 There is a slightly unfortunate clash between our use of “structural reasoning”
and the sequent calculus notion of “structural rule”. For us, structural reasoning
is implemented by the non-structural rules of sequent calculus. Our terminology is
chosen to be consistent with the sense of “structural” in “structural operational
semantics”, in which the premises of a rule are obtained by a similar syntactic
decomposition of the conclusion.
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However, we are here envisaging an applied sequent calculus with sequents
composed of verification assertions, rather than a pure logical calculus. Such
a system cannot be based on logical rules alone. One also needs rules to relate
processes (or programs) to their logical properties. The question thus arises
as to whether it is possible to provide such applied proof systems without
breaking the fundamental structural properties of sequent calculus.
In this paper we show that this is indeed possible, at least for processes with
an operational semantics specified in the GSOS format, and for propositional
modal logic (Hennessy-Milner logic [16]). Our method of approach concerns
adding introduction rules, on the left and right of sequents, for process op-
erators, in addition to the standard rules for the logical connectives. These
proof rules for process operators are derived in a principled way directly from
the operational semantics. Thus the approach also provides a modular proof
system, easily adaptable to a range of process algebras.
At the end of the paper we include an epilogue discussing work that has been
done, since the research in this paper was first carried out, towards adapting
our approach to richer program logics and other programming paradigms.
2 Proof rules for modalities and process operators
In this section we present an informal introduction to our approach of in-
corporating proof rules for modalities and process operators into the sequent
calculus. A detailed technical treatment is given in Section 4.
As motivated in Section 1, the proof system is a sequent calculus with se-
quents of the form Γ =⇒ ∆ where Γ and ∆ are finite sets of assertions. Our
main assertion form in p :A, where p is term representing a process and A
is a formula of Hennessy-Milner logic [16]. For illustrative purposes, we use
CCS [18] as the process language in this section. As discussed in Section 1, we
allow process terms to contain free process variables.
The task we address is how to give proof rules for the logic and for the process
operators. We consider each issue in turn.
For the formulas of Hennessy-Milner logic we need proof rules both for the
propositional connectives and for the modalities. The rules for the former are
standard. For the modalities, we give rules which reflect in as direct a way as
possible their meanings. For example, in the case of the necessity modality,
we have that p satisfies [a]A (where a is some action) if and only if, for every
process q such that p can perform a to become q (notation p
a→ q), it holds
that q satisfies A. In order to translate this in terms of primitive rules it is
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necessary to have a further assertion form expressing that p
a→q for processes
p and q. Then one has natural rules:
Γ =⇒ p a→q, ∆ Γ, q :A =⇒ ∆
Γ, p : [a]A =⇒ ∆
Γ, p
a→x =⇒ x :A, ∆
Γ =⇒ p : [a]A, ∆
(1)
where, in the right-hand rule, x is a variable (ranging over processes) that
does not appear in the concluding sequent of the rule, thus x represents an
arbitrary process to which p can evolve via a.
The rules for process operators are derived from the operational semantics of
the process algebra, making crucial use of the presence of p
a→ q assertions.
Indeed, the right-hand rules are copied directly from the operational semantics.
For example, the rules for the CCS prefix and sum operators [18] are:
Γ =⇒ a.p a→p, ∆
Γ =⇒ p a→p′, ∆
Γ =⇒ p+ q a→p′, ∆
Γ =⇒ q a→q′, ∆
Γ =⇒ p+ q a→q′, ∆
The rules for introducing process operators on the left express that an action
f(p1, . . . , pk)
a→r may only happen if it is derivable via one of the operational
rules for f . For example, for the prefix, zero and sum operators of CCS, this
property is expressed by the following rules:
Γ[p, r] =⇒ ∆[p, r]
Γ[r, p], a.p
a→r =⇒ ∆[r, p]
a 6= b
Γ, a.p
b→r =⇒ ∆
Γ, 0
a→r =⇒ ∆
Γ, p
a→r =⇒ ∆ Γ, q a→r =⇒ ∆
Γ, p+ q
a→r =⇒ ∆
Here we write Γ[p, r] for Γ[p/x, q/y], where neither x nor y occur in p and r.
Then Γ[r, p] is simply Γ[r/x, p/y]. Equivalently, one can understand Γ[p, r] as
simply a set of assertions with some (but not necessarily all) occurrences of
p and q highlighted, in which case Γ[r, p] is then obtained by replacing the
distinguished occurrences of p with r, and vice versa. Incidentally, we have
not mentioned a right-hand rule for zero because it does not have one.
All the rules we have discussed so far have the properties we identified in
Section 1 as being desirable of structural reasoning. In the modality rules,
the formula [a]A in the rule conclusion is decomposed to the formula A in the
premise. In the operational rules, a conclusion involving a process f(p1, . . . , pk)
is derived from premises mentioning only its arguments p1, . . . , pk.
One would like some further assurance that the left and right rules for pro-
cess operators are well chosen. One yardstick by which this can be judged,
is whether they properly complement each other in the sense of supporting
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local cut-elimination steps. Unfortunately, the rules formulated above do not
support such proof reductions. For example, the following derivation just uses
the above process rules and cut:
b.0
c→0 =⇒
c.0
c→0, a.b.0 a→c.0 =⇒ =⇒ c.0 c→0
cut
a.b.0
a→c.0 =⇒
but there is no way of eliminating cut from the derivation. The sequents
a.b.0
a→ x, a.c.0 a→ x =⇒ and a.b.0 + c.d.0 a→ x, a.b.0 + c.d.0 c→ x =⇒ give
other examples of similar phenomena. This failure of cut-elimination does not
seem to be a result of the particular formulation of the rules, but rather an
unavoidable problem for the sequents considered above. As seems desirable,
all the rules are sound (in a sense explained in Section 4) relative to models
in which bisimilar processes are identified. So the only way to show the im-
possibility of a.p
a→ q is to show that p and q are not bisimilar. This involves
considering the hereditary behaviour of p and q, and a cut is required to effect
such an argument.
Rather than changing the rules, we address the non-eliminability of cut by re-
stricting the class of sequents. Serendipitously, it turns out that if one imposes
certain natural structural requirements on sequents (excluding, amongst oth-
ers, the sequents above) then a full cut-elimination result holds for the proof
system. This means that structural reasoning is alone sufficient for establishing
any goal. Of course this result in no way devalues the importance of composi-
tional reasoning, which does require cut. The situation is analogous to that for
ordinary logic, where the cut rule is essential for structuring proofs using lem-
mas, and where the eliminability of cut in no way undermines the usefulness
of lemmas in proofs.
In Section 4, we present our approach in detail. There, we formulate a sequent
calculus for any process algebra whose operational semantics is specified in the
GSOS format [5]. The choice of GSOS format is motivated by its wide expres-
sivity. As is argued in [5], the GSOS format apparently forms the largest class
of operational rule that enjoys certain basic sanity properties. In particular,
GSOS rules generate transition systems with finite image, and strong bisimu-
lation is a congruence relative to any GSOS operator. In this paper, a further
benefit of the use of GSOS systems is that their generic rule format allows us
to explicitly exhibit the uniformity in our method of deriving sequent calculus
proof rules from operational semantics.
The main result of Section 4 is a completeness theorem for the sequent calculus
(Theorem 2), relative to a natural algebraic notion of GSOS model introduced
in Section 3. The completeness theorem is for a cut-free proof system. Thus
the admissibility of the cut rule is obtained as a corollary of completeness
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(Corollary 1). Proving completeness is the central technical task of the paper,
and Section 5 is devoted to this.
For the purpose of process verification, one is interested in having completeness
relative to the “intended” model, given by the process calculus itself, rather
than relative to a general class of models. In Section 6, we show that, for
certain sequents, the proof system is indeed complete for deriving truth in the
intended model (Theorem 3). Furthermore, we give necessary and sufficient
conditions for an ω-completeness result to hold (Theorem 4). The latter result
implies, as a special case, that the sequent calculus is complete for deriving
parametrized verification goals in the sense of Section 1.
3 Technical preliminaries
This section provides the technical background for the rest of the paper. We
review the GSOS rule format for specifying the operational semantics of pro-
cesses [5], we introduce a general algebraic notion of GSOS model, we recall
the stratified definition of strong bisimilarity, we review Hennessy-Milner logic
and its relationship to bisimilarity [16], and we establish basic properties of
the class of finite processes.
First some notational and terminological preliminaries. Given a binary relation
R, we write R+ for its transitive closure. We say that R is well-founded if
there is no infinite sequence (xi) with xi+1Rxi for all i. Given a set X we write
P(X) for the powerset of X, and Pfin(X) for the finite powerset. We say that
a property holds for almost all natural numbers, to mean that it holds for all
but finitely many numbers.
We use x, y, z, . . . to range over a countably infinite set, Vars, of process vari-
ables. We use f, g, . . . to range over a countable set of operator symbols each
of which has an associated arity ≥ 0. We use p, q, r, . . . to range over process
terms built from the operators and variables in the standard way, respecting
arities. We write r(~x) to mean that all the variables of r are contained in the
vector of distinct variables ~x; in which case, given a vector of process terms,
~p, of the same length as ~x, we write r(~p) for the process term obtained by the
evident substitution. We write Vars(p) for the set of variables appearing in p.
We say that p is closed if Vars(p) = ∅. For V ⊆ Vars, we write TermsV for the
set of all terms p with Vars(p) ⊆ V .
A substitution function, σ, is a total function from variables to process terms.
We also write σ for the unique homomorphism on process terms determined by
a substitution function. Thus σ(p) means the term obtained by substituting
σ(x) for each variable x in p.
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The operational semantics is to be specified by a GSOS system [5]. We use
a, b, c, . . . to range over a finite set, Act, of actions. A GSOS rule has the form:
{xi aij→yij}1≤i≤k1≤j≤mi {xi
bij9}1≤i≤k1≤j≤ni
f(x1, . . . , xk)
c→r(~x, ~y)
(2)
where: all the variables are distinct; ~x and ~y are the vectors of all xi and yij
variables respectively; mi, ni ≥ 0; and k is the arity of f . We say that f is
the operator of the rule and c is its action. A GSOS system, R, is given by a
set of GSOS rules containing, for each operator-action pair f, c, only a finite
number of rules with operator f and action c. Henceforth, we assume given a
fixed GSOS system, R.
Normally a GSOS system is used to determine a labelled transition system
between closed processes giving their operational behaviour. We shall be in-
terested in this transition system as one intended model amongst a wider
class of models, see Definition 3.1 below. First, some preliminary definitions.
A (labelled) transition system is a structure of the form T = (|T |, { a→T}a∈Act)
where: |T | is a set (of states); and a→T is a binary relation on |T | for each
action a. We use s, t, . . . to range over states of transition systems, and we
often write s ∈ T rather than s ∈ |T |. We write s a9T if there does not exist
t such that s
a→T t. For s ∈ T define succa(s) = {t | s a→T t}. We say that T
is image finite if, for each state s ∈ T , the set ⋃a∈Act succa(s) is finite.
A premodel is a structure T = (|T |, { a→T}, {fT}) where: (|T |, { a→T}) is a tran-
sition system; and fT is a k-ary function on |T | for each operator f of arity k.
Given premodels S, T , we say a binary relation R ⊆ |S| × |T | is a generalized
congruence if, for all s1, . . . sk ∈ |S| and t1, . . . , tk ∈ |T |, and k-ary f , it holds
that R(fS(s1, . . . , sk), fT (t1, . . . , tk)) whenever R(si, ti) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Given a premodel T , an environment is a function from process variables to
|T |. Given an environment γ, we write γ[x 7→ t] for the environment obtained
from γ by updating the value at x to t. An environment γ induces a function
mapping each process term p to a state γ(p) ∈ |T |, defined inductively by
γ(f(p1, . . . , pk)) = fT (γ(p1), . . . , γ(pk)),
for each operator f . Clearly γ(p) depends only on the values taken by γ on
Vars(p). Often, rather than dealing with environments directly, we shall more
conveniently write p(t1, . . . , tk) for the value γ(p) of a term p(x1, . . . , xk) in
any environment γ with γ(x1) = t1 and . . . and γ(xk) = tk.
Definition 3.1 (GSOS model) We say that a premodel T is a model if it
holds that f(s1, . . . , sk)
c→T s′ if and only if there exists a rule in R, of the
form (2) above, and there exist states {tij}1≤j≤ni1≤i≤k such that:
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(1) for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ mi, it holds that si aij→T tij;
(2) for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, it holds that si bij9T ; and
(3) s′ = r(~s,~t).
The above definition essentially implements the soundness and witnessing
properties of [5, §4.3] within a general algebraic framework.
Of particular interest are term models. The existence and uniqueness of these
is given by the result below.
Proposition 3.2 For any V ⊆ Vars, and B ⊆ V × Act × TermsV , there
is a unique model T satisfying: |T | = TermsV ; for each operator f of arity
k, it holds that fT (p1, . . . , pk) = f(p1, . . . , pk); and x
a→T p if and only if
(x, a, p) ∈ B.
PROOF. One shows, by an easy structural induction on a term p, that the
transitions out of p are uniquely determined by the initial data. 2
The V = ∅ case of the proposition is just Lemma 4.3.9 of [5]. We refer to this
model as the closed term model, and we write TR for it. In cases in which one
thinks of R as specifying a complete self-contained language, it is natural to
think of the closed term model as the “intended” operational model of R. Our
general notion of model also includes all quotients of the closed term models of
disjoint extensions of R, in the sense of [1, Def. 2.11], by congruence relations
contained in bisimilarity. Of course, there are many non-term models too.
In Theorem 5.1.1 of [5], it is observed that the closed term model is image
finite. This property does not, of course, hold for arbitrary models. So we shall
avoid making assumptions that depend upon image finiteness.
One of the basic results about GSOS systems is that bisimulation is a conguence
on closed terms, [5, Theorem 5.1.2]. We shall need a stratified generalization
of this result to arbitrary GSOS models, Proposition 3.4 below. Accordingly,
we recall the relation ∼ of (strong) bisimilarity between states of transition
systems, and its ordinal-indexed approximations ∼α, see e.g. [18, §10.4]. For
transition systems S and T and ordinals α, the relation ∼STα between |S| and
|T | is defined by:
s ∼STα+1 t iff s a→S s′ implies ∃t′ such that t a→T t′ and s′ ∼STα t′, and
t
a→T t′ implies ∃s′ such that s a→S s′ and s′ ∼STα t′,
s ∼STλ t iff for all α < λ, s ∼STα t, when λ is a limit ordinal.
10
Note that, vacuously, s ∼ST0 t always holds. Also s ∼STα t implies s ∼STα′ t, for
all ordinals α′ ≤ α. Bisimilarity is defined by:
s ∼ST t iff for all ordinals α, s ∼STα t.
Note that the bisimilarity relation ∼ST always coincides with ∼STα for some
sufficiently large α; for example, take α to be the smallest cardinal strictly
greater than the cardinality of P(|S| × |T |). 3 This allows results about ∼ST
to be inferred easily from properties of the ∼STα relations. For example, one
obtains the fixed-point property of ∼ST .
s ∼ST t iff s a→S s′ implies ∃t′ such that t a→T t′ and s′ ∼ST t′, and
t
a→T t′ implies ∃s′ such that s a→S s′ and s′ ∼ST t′.
(3)
Similarly, one immediately derives the analogues for ∼ST of Propositions 3.3
and 3.4 below.
Proposition 3.3
(1) For all s ∈ S, it holds that s ∼SSα s.
(2) If s ∼STα t then t ∼TSα s.
(3) If s ∼SS′α s′ and s′ ∼S′S′′α s′′ then s ∼SS′′α s′′.
The proof is both standard and routine, so omitted.
Proposition 3.4 If S and T are models then ∼STα is a generalized congruence.
In the proof, and henceforth, we shall drop superscripts on the ∼STα (and ∼ST )
relations, as they can always be inferred from the context.
PROOF. By transfinite induction on α. The case for a limit ordinal is trivial,
as generalized congruences are closed under intersection. To show the result
for successor ordinals, assume that ∼α is a generalized congruence and suppose
si ∼α+1 ti, for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We must show that f(s1, . . . , sk) ∼α+1
f(t1, . . . , tk).
Suppose f(s1, . . . , sk)
c→S s′. We must find t′ such that f(t1, . . . , tk) c→T t′ and
s′ ∼α t′. By the definition of model, there exists a rule in R of the form (2)
above and there exist {s′′ij}1≤j≤nia≤i≤k such that:
(1) si
aij→S s′′ij, for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ mi;
(2) si
bij9S, for all i, j′ where 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j′ ≤ ni; and
3 If S and T are image finite then α can be taken to be ω, see [16, Theorem 2.1].
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(3) s′ = r(~s, ~s′′).
For each i, j as above, we have si ∼α+1 ti, so, by 1, there exists tij such that
ti
aij→S t′′ij and s′′ij ∼α t′′ij. Also, for each i, j′, we have ti
bij9T , again because
si ∼α+1 ti. Thus, by the definition of model, t c→T r(~t, ~t′′). Moreover, by the
induction hypothesis, r(~s, ~s′′) ∼α r(~t, ~t′′), i.e. s ∼α r(~t, ~t′′). Thus r(~t, ~t′′) is the
state t′ we are looking for.
A similar argument establishes that fT (t1, . . . , tk)
c→T t′ implies that there
exists s′ with f(s1, . . . , sk)
c→S s′ and s′ ∼α t′. 2
Theorem 5.1.2 of [5] follows, as it is just the special case of the Proposition 3.4
in which ∼α is the relation ∼ between the closed term model TR and itself.
Also, it follows that, for any closed process p and models S, T , we have pS ∼ pT ,
where pS (resp. pT ) is the interpretation of p in S (resp. T ).
Next we review Hennessy-Milner logic [16]. We use A,B,C, . . . to range over
formulas, which are given by the grammar:
A ::= > | ¬A | A ∧B | 〈a〉A.
The other connectives and the [a] modality can be defined by:
⊥ = ¬> A ∨B = ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B) [a]A = ¬〈a〉¬A.
Given a labelled transition system, T = (|T |, { a→T}), the satisfaction relation,
T , relating states of T and formulas, is defined as usual: 4
t T > always holds
t T ¬A iff t 6T A
t T A ∧B iff t T A and t T B
t T 〈a〉A iff if there exists t′ such that t a→T t′ and t′ T A.
The modal depth, md(A), of a formula A is defined by:
md(>) = 0 md(A ∧B) = max(md(A),md(B))
md(¬A) = md(A) md(〈a〉A) = 1 + md(A).
Proposition 3.5 If S, T are transition systems then, for any s ∈ S and t ∈ T ,
the following are equivalent:
(1) s ∼m t.
4 We use the symbol  rather than |=, because, for us, T is the model, rather than
t. Moreover, the symbol |= is already “overloaded” by other uses in Section 4.
12
(2) For all A with md(A) ≤ m, it holds that s S A if and only if t T A.
Theorem 2.2 of [16] states a similar result, but the setting is slightly different.
In [16], T is required to be image finite, but Act is allowed to be infinite. The
proof of the (1) =⇒ (2) direction in [16] does not use the assumption of image
finiteness, and thus establishes this implication of Proposition 3.5. However,
the proof in [16] of the (2) =⇒ (1) implication does make essential use of
image finiteness. Indeed, when Act is infinite, such an assumption is necessary.
Nevertheless, for finite Act, the (2) =⇒ (1) implication holds without any
restrictions on T, s and t. We include a proof of this at the end of the section.
The final goal of this section is to establish various basic results about finite
processes, which will be required in Section 6. Define:
F0 = {∅} Fi+1 = P(Act× Fi) F =
⋃
i≥0
Fi.
Note that i ≤ j implies Fi ⊆ Fj. Also, because Act is finite, each u ∈ F is
a finite set. Indeed, F is the smallest set such that F = Pfin(Act × F ). We
consider F as a transition system, with the transition relation:
u
a→F u′ iff (a, u′) ∈ u.
We call the states in F the finite processes. If u ∈ Fi then u is a finite process
of depth at most i.
Proposition 3.6 For every transition system T and t ∈ T :
(1) There exists a unique utm ∈ Fm such that t ∼m utm.
(2) For every u ∈ Fm, if t ∼m+1 u then t ∼ u.
PROOF. We first prove statement 1 by induction on m. When m = 0, we
have ∅ is the unique element of F0 and trivially t ∼0 ∅. When m > 1, for
each a ∈ Act and t′ ∈ succa(t) we have, by the induction hypothesis, a unique
ut
′
m−1 ∈ Fm−1 such that t′ ∼m−1 utm−1. Define
utm = {(a, ut
′
m−1) | a ∈ Act and t′ ∈ succa(t)}.
It is easily verified that t ∼m utm. For uniqueness, consider any u ∈ Fm such
that t ∼m u. Whenever t a→T t′, there exists u′ such that u a→F u′ and
t′ ∼m−1 u′. But then u′ = ut′m−1, by the uniqueness of ut′m−1. Hence u a→F ut′m−1,
i.e. (a, ut
′
m−1) ∈ u. This shows that utm ⊆ u. For the converse inclusion, suppose
that (a, u′) ∈ u, i.e. u a→F u′. Then there exists t′ such that t a→T t′ and
t′ ∼m−1 u′. Again, by the uniqueness of ut′m−1, we have u′ = ut′m−1. Thus
indeed (a, u′) ∈ utm, by the definition of utm. So u = utm, as required.
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Statement 2 is also proved by induction on m. Observe that, for α > 0, we
have ∅ ∼ t if and only if t a9T for all actions a ∈ Act if and only if ∅ ∼1 t. The
m = 0 case is now immediate as ∅ is the unique element of F0. For m > 0,
take any u ∈ Fm, and suppose that t ∼m+1 u. We show that t ∼ u. Suppose
first that t
a→T t′. Then there exists u′ such that u a→F u′ and t′ ∼m u′. But
u′ ∈ Fm−1. So, by the induction hypothesis, t′ ∼ u′. Also, if u a→F u′ then
there exists t
a→T t′ such that t′ ∼m u′. Then u′ ∈ Fm−1. So, again by the
induction hypothesis, t′ ∼ u′. Thus, by (3), indeed t ∼ u. 2
An important property of finite processes is that each has a characteristic
formula up to ∼m and ∼, in the sense of the proposition below. Statement (2)
of the proposition is based on [15, Theorem 1].
Proposition 3.7
(1) For all u ∈ Fm, there exists a formula χm(u) with md(χm(u)) ≤ m such
that, for all transition systems T and t ∈ T , it holds that t T χm(u) if
and only t ∼m u.
(2) For all u ∈ F , there exists a formula χ(u) such that, for all transition
systems T and t ∈ T , it holds that t T χ(u) if and only t ∼ u.
PROOF. Statement 1 is proved by induction on m. When m = 0, the only
u ∈ F0 is u = ∅. Define χ0(∅) = >. Then t T χm(∅) always holds, as does
t ∼0 ∅. Suppose m > 0, and consider any u ∈ Fm. Define
χm(u) = (
∧
(a,u′)∈u 〈a〉χm−1(u
′)) ∧ (∧
a∈Act [a] (
∨
u′∈{u′|(a,u′)∈u} χm−1(u
′))).
(N.b. an empty conjunction is > and an empty disjunction is ⊥.) We have
md(χm(u)) ≤ m because each md(χm−1(u′)) ≤ m−1, by induction hypothesis.
To prove that t T χm(u) implies t ∼m u, assume that t T χm(u). Suppose
t
a→T t′. Then, because t T χm(u), it holds that t′ T ∨u′∈{u′|(a,u′)∈u}χm−1(u′).
So, for some u′ with (a, u′) ∈ u, we have t′ T χm−1(u′). Thus, by the induction
hypothesis, t′ ∼m−1 u′. Also u a→F u′ because (a, u′) ∈ u. Thus t a→T t′ implies
there indeed exists u′ with u a→F u′ and t′ ∼m−1 u′. For the other implication in
the definition of ∼m, suppose u a→F u′, i.e. (a, u′) ∈ u. Then t T 〈a〉χm−1(u′).
Thus there exists t′ such that t a→T t′ and t′ T χm−1(u′). By the induction
hypothesis t′ ∼m−1 u′ as required. Thus indeed t T χm(u) implies t ∼m u.
For the converse implication, assume that t ∼m u. We show that t T χm(u).
To establish that t T
∧
(a,u′)∈u 〈a〉χm−1(u′), consider any (a, u′) ∈ u. Then
u
a→F u′. So, as t ∼m u, we have t a→T t′ for some t′ such that t′ ∼m−1 u′. By
the induction hypothesis, t′ T χm−1(u). So t T 〈a〉χm−1(u′), as required. To
establish that t T
∧
a∈Act [a] (
∨
u′∈{u′|(a,u′)∈u} χm−1(u′)), consider any a ∈ Act
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and suppose that t
a→T t′. Because t ∼m u, we have u a→F u′ for some u′ with
t′ ∼m−1 u′. By the induction hypothesis, t′ T χm−1(u′). Also, (a, u′) ∈ u, so
t′ T
∨
u′∈{u′|(a,u′)∈u} χm−1(u′), as required. This proves statement 1.
Statement 2 now follows easily. Consider any u ∈ F . Then there is a least
m such that u ∈ Fm. Define χ(u) = χm+1(u). We then have t t χ(u) iff
t t χm+1(u) iff (by 1 above) t ∼m+1 u iff (by Proposition 3.6(2)) t ∼ u. 2
Having obtained the above results, we can now establish the (2) =⇒ (1)
implication of Proposition 3.5, as promised above.
PROOF of Proposition 3.5 (2) =⇒ (1). Suppose that s S A if and
only if t T A, for all A with md(A) ≤ m. By Proposition 3.6(1), there exists
a unique usm ∈ Fm such that s ∼m usm. By Proposition 3.7(1), s S χm(usm).
As md(χm(u
s
m)) ≤ m, we have, by assumption, that t T χm(usm). Thus, by
Proposition 3.7(1), t ∼m usm. We have that s ∼m usm and t ∼m usm. It follows,
by Proposition 3.3, that s ∼m t, as required. 2
4 The sequent calculus
In this section we present our applied sequent calculus. As motivated in Section
2, it has different assertion forms: logical assertions p :A, and action assertions
p
a→ q. In addition, as the operational semantics allows negative premises, we
include inaction assertions of the form p
a9. We use J,K, . . . to range over
assertions and Γ,∆, . . . to range over (possibly infinite) sets of assertions.
Assertions have interpretations in arbitrary premodels. A relation T |=γ J
between premodels T , environments γ and assertions J is defined by:
T |=γ p a→q iff γ(p) a→T γ(q),
T |=γ p a9 iff γ(p) a9T ,
T |=γ p :A iff γ(p) T A.
Observe that T |=γ p a9 if and only if T |=γ [a]⊥. Thus the inclusion of inaction
assertions is, expressivity wise, unnecessary. Nevertheless, we find it convenient
to include them, as it allows a clean separation between (in)action assertions,
used in formalizing the operational semantics, and logical assertions.
We write Γ |=T ∆ to mean that, for all environments γ, if, for all J ∈ Γ, it
holds that T |=γ J then there exists K ∈ ∆ such that T |=γ K. We write
Γ |= ∆ to mean that Γ |=T ∆ for all models T .
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The sequent calculus uses sequents of the form Γ =⇒ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are
finite, which are to be read as expressing that Γ |= ∆. As we saw in Section
2, there are problems in obtaining a cut-free system for arbitrary sequents.
We avoid these problems by defining a proof system operating on a restricted
class of sequents. This restricted class is obtained by imposing conditions on
the left-hand set of assertions.
Definition 4.1 (Assumable set) A (possibly infinite) set of assertions, Γ,
is said to be assumable if it satisfies the following three conditions.
(A1) If p
a→q ∈ Γ then q is a process variable.
(A2) If p
a→x ∈ Γ and q b→x ∈ Γ then p = q (syntactic identity) and a = b.
(A3) The relation, Γ, on process variables, defined by xΓ y if there exists
p
a→y ∈ Γ such that p contains x, is well-founded.
Note that any subset of an assumable set is itself assumable.
Definition 4.2 (Admissible sequent) We call a sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ admis-
sible if Γ is assumable.
Our sequent calculus will work with admissible sequents.
Conditions (A1)–(A3) above are the simplest we could find with which we
could obtain completeness and cut-elimination theorems. The three counterex-
amples from Section 2 are ruled out by conditions (A1) and (A2). Condi-
tion (A3) prevents, for example, assertions p
a→ x from occurring in Γ when
x ∈ Vars(p). For p containing arbitrary GSOS operators (involving negative
premises) it may be impossible to satisfy such assertions for reasons to do with
the nonexistence of solutions to arbitrary unguarded recursion equations. As
in Section 2, one can find examples of such assertions for which the sequent
p
a→x =⇒ apparently requires cut to be derivable.
The conditions on assumability are also intuitively motivated in the follow-
ing way. They amount to being able to construct Γ from the empty set by
(transfinitely) adding assertions one at a time, subject to the restriction that,
whenever an action assertion p
a→x is added, x neither occurs in p nor in any
of the assertions already included. Thus, at the time of adding p
a→ x, the
variable x is unconstrained and represents an arbitrary process to which p can
evolve. There is an analogy here with the declaration of variables in dependent
type theories. Indeed, if one reads p
a→q as an assertion that q has “type” p a→,
then the conditions on assumability are just an infinitary generalization of the
usual dependency requirements on contexts.
We now give the proof rules for the sequent calculus. In the rules we adopt
standard notational conventions, using comma for set union, omitting the
empty set and omitting delimiters from singleton sets. Each rule is to be read
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as applying only when the premises and conclusion are all admissible sequents.
We present two proof systems: a basic proof system, and a full proof system.
The rules for the basic system are contained in Figs. 1–3. Additional rules for
the full system are listed in Fig. 4
The rules for logical assertions are presented in Fig. 1. These rules essentially
form a sequent calculus for a multi-modality version of the minimal modal logic
K, albeit with the extra baggage of process terms and (in)action assertions.
The rules for inaction assertions are presented in Fig. 2. They are a straight-
forward implementation of the definition of
a9 in terms of a→.
The rules for action assertions are presented in Fig. 3. The rationale behind
them is that the method of deriving an action assertion p
c→q depends on the
structure of p. If p is a variable y, then the only applicable rule is the (
c→Ax)
rule. This is just an instance of the familiar identity axiom of sequent calculus.
It is the only instance of the identity axiom included in the basic proof system.
When p is of the form f(p1, . . . , pk), for some operator f , then the rules for de-
riving p
c→q are determined by the GSOS system R. Suppose that R contains
exactly lfc rules with operator f and action c, so for each h with 1 ≤ h ≤ lfc
we have a distinct rule:
{xi ahij→ yij}1≤i≤k1≤j≤mhi {xi
bhij9}1≤i≤k1≤j≤nhi
f(x1, . . . , xk)
c→rh(~x, ~y)
(4)
Then we include lfc rules in the sequent calculus for introducing action asser-
tions of the form f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→ r on the right of sequents, namely the rules
(f
c→R)1, . . . , (f c→R)lfc ; and we include one rule introducing such assertions
on the left, namely the rule (f
c→L). Note that in any application of (f c→L),
when lfc > 0, it must be the case that f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→x 6∈ Γ, as otherwise the
premises would not be admissible. We give examples of the rules generated by
some specific process operators below.
Observe that the basic system contains none of the usual “structural rules” of
sequent calculus. The exchange and contraction rules are redundant because
sequents are built from finite sets. The full system is obtained from the basic
system by extending it with the rules of Fig. 4, all of which may be reasonably
described as “structural rules”. These rules include the standard weakening
rules (WkL) and (WkR), and the standard axiom rule (Ax). Note that, in these
rules, admissibility considerations require that any action assertion p
a→ q,
appearing as J on the left-hand side of a sequent, must be of the form p
a→x.
The substitution and cut rules, (Sub) and (Cut), are as expected. However, for
action assertions, we also include a natural combination of the two, (
c→Cut),
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(>R)
Γ =⇒ p :>, ∆
Γ =⇒ p :A, ∆
(¬L)
Γ, p :¬A =⇒ ∆
Γ, p :A =⇒ ∆
(¬R)
Γ =⇒ p :¬A, ∆
Γ, p :A, p :B =⇒ ∆
(∧L)
Γ, p :A ∧B =⇒ ∆
Γ =⇒ p :A, ∆ Γ =⇒ p :B, ∆
(∧R)
Γ =⇒ p :A ∧B, ∆
Γ, p
a→x, x :A =⇒ ∆
(〈a〉L)∗
Γ, p : 〈a〉A =⇒ ∆
Γ =⇒ p a→q, ∆ Γ =⇒ q :A, ∆
(〈a〉R)
Γ =⇒ p : 〈a〉A, ∆
∗Restriction on (〈a〉L): the variable x must not occur in the rule conclusion.
Fig. 1. Rules for logical assertions
Γ =⇒ p a→q, ∆
(
a9L)
Γ, p
a9=⇒ ∆
Γ, p
a→x =⇒ ∆
(
a9R)∗
Γ =⇒ p a9, ∆
∗Restriction on ( a9R): the variable x must not occur in the rule conclusion.
Fig. 2. Rules for inaction assertions
(
c→Ax)
Γ, y
c→x =⇒ y c→x, ∆
{Γ =⇒ pi ahij→ qhij, ∆}1≤i≤k1≤j≤mhi {Γ =⇒ pi
bhij9 , ∆}1≤i≤k1≤j≤nhi
(f
c→R)h
Γ =⇒ f(p1, . . . , pk) c→rh(~p, ~q), ∆
{
Γ[rh(~p, ~y)/x], {pi ahij→ yij}1≤i≤k1≤j≤mhi , {pi
bhij9}1≤i≤k1≤j≤nhi =⇒ ∆[rh(~p, ~y)/x]
}
1≤h≤lfc (f c→L)∗
Γ, f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→x =⇒ ∆
∗Restriction on (f c→L): all of the variables yij are distinct and do not occur
in the rule conclusion.
Fig. 3. Rules for action assertions
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(Ax)
Γ, J =⇒ J, ∆
Γ =⇒ ∆
(WkL)
Γ, J =⇒ ∆
Γ =⇒ ∆
(WkR)
Γ =⇒ J, ∆
Γ =⇒ ∆
(Sub)
Γ[p/x] =⇒ ∆[p/x]
Γ, J =⇒ ∆ Γ =⇒ J, ∆
(Cut)
Γ =⇒ ∆
Γ, p
c→x =⇒ ∆ Γ[q/x] =⇒ p c→q, ∆[q/x]
(
c→Cut)
Γ[q/x] =⇒ ∆[q/x]
Fig. 4. Additional rules for the full proof system
which allows one to cut out an arbitrary action assertion from the right-hand
side of a sequent in a way that is consistent admissibility requirements.
The ethos behind the separation of the basic and full proof systems is as
follows. Each rule in the basic system is associated to a single logical connective
or operational primitive. Moreover, the premises of the rule are obtained by
decomposing a formula or process term in a principled way depending on the
associated primitive. Furthermore, each rule embodies, as directly as possible,
a basic logical property of its associated notion. Thus the rules of the basic
system directly implement structural and natural reasoning in the sense of
Section 1. On the other hand, the rules of the extended system implement
general properties of logical consequence, useful for modularizing proofs, and
essential for formalizing compositional verification methods.
Before stating our main results we give some illustrative examples of the in-
duced rules for particular process operators. For the prefix, zero and sum
operators, the right-hand rules are the same as those given earlier in Section
2. The left-hand rules differ in that they are specifically tailored to admissible
sequents. The new versions are (modulo trivial variable renamings):
Γ[p/x] =⇒ ∆[p/x]
Γ, a.p
a→x =⇒ ∆
a 6= b
Γ, a.p
b→x =⇒ ∆
Γ, 0
a→x =⇒ ∆
Γ, p
a→x =⇒ ∆ Γ, q a→x =⇒ ∆
Γ, p+ q
a→x =⇒ ∆
All the rules are special cases of their earlier counterparts. We remark that
the renaming and restriction operators of CCS can also be dealt with easily.
Parallel operators are more interesting. First, we consider the interleaving
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(non-communicating) parallel, p||q, whose operational rules are:
x
a→x′
x||y a→x′||y
y
a→y′
x||y a→x||y′
The derived sequent rules for || are therefore:
Γ =⇒ p a→p′, ∆
Γ =⇒ p||q a→p′||q, ∆
Γ =⇒ q a→q′, ∆
Γ =⇒ p||q a→p||q′, ∆
Γ[x||q / z], p a→x =⇒ ∆[x||q / z] Γ[p||y / z], q a→y =⇒ ∆[p||y / z]
Γ, p||q a→z =⇒ ∆
where in the last rule, the variables x and y must not appear in the concluding
sequent. This rule nicely illustrates the difference between structural and com-
positional proof methods. The rule is manifestly structural, as the premises
are obtained via syntactic decompositions of the conclusion. In particular, the
assertion p||q a→ z in the conclusion is broken down into assertions p a→x and
q
a→ y in the premises. However, the rule is not compositional, because each
premise contains both the process terms p and q.
The communicating parallel p|q of CCS is slightly more complicated, due to
the fact that a silent τ action can be triggered by a synchronization on any
non-τ action. Thus the left-hand rule for p|q τ→z assertions is
Γ1, p
τ→x =⇒ ∆1 Γ2, q τ→y =⇒ ∆2 {Γ3, p a→x, q a→y =⇒ ∆3}a∈Act\{τ}
Γ, p|q τ→z =⇒ ∆
where: Γ1,∆1 are obtained from Γ,∆ using the substitution [x|q / z]; the sets
Γ2,∆2 are obtained using [p|y / z]; the sets Γ3,∆3 are obtained using [x|y / z];
and x, y do not appear in the rule conclusion. Similar complexities in the
handling of communicating parallel were encountered by Stirling [25]. In our
setting, a natural way of reducing the complexity would be to include an al-
gebra of action variables and terms (e.g. (·) should be a unary operator on
actions), together with a new assertion form stating equality between action
terms. However, to properly incorporate these features, similar such modifica-
tions must also be made at the level of the GSOS rule specifications. In this
paper, we content ourselves with dealing with ordinary GSOS specifications,
based on a finite set of actions.
None of the example operators above exploits the GSOS feature of allowing
negative premises (inaction assertions) in operational rules. For an example
involving inaction assertions, the reader is referred to the original conference
version of this paper [23].
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Subderivation (A):
=⇒ x′′||y :>
x′ b→x′′ =⇒ x′ b→x′′
x′ b→x′′ =⇒ x′||y b→x′′||y
x′ b→x′′, x′′ :> =⇒ x′||y′ : 〈b〉>
x′ : 〈b〉> =⇒ x′||y : 〈b〉> x a→x′ =⇒ x a→x′
x : [a]〈b〉>, x a→x′ =⇒ x′||y : 〈b〉>
Subderivation (B):
=⇒ x′||y′ :>
x
b→x′ =⇒ x b→x′
x
b→x′ =⇒ x||y′ b→x′||y′
x
b→x′, x′ :> =⇒ x||y′ : 〈b〉>
x : 〈b〉>, y a→y′ =⇒ x||y′ : 〈b〉>
Main derivation:
··· (A)
x : [a]〈b〉>, x a→x′ =⇒ x′||y : 〈b〉>
··· (B)
x : 〈b〉>, y a→y′ =⇒ x||y′ : 〈b〉>
x : 〈b〉>, x : [a]〈b〉>, x||y a→z =⇒ z : 〈b〉>
x : 〈b〉>, x : [a]〈b〉> =⇒ x||y : [a]〈b〉>
Fig. 5. Example derivation of x : 〈b〉>, x : [a]〈b〉> =⇒ x||y : [a]〈b〉>.
To show the basic proof system at work, we give in Fig. 5 an example derivation
of the sequent x : 〈b〉>, x : [a]〈b〉> =⇒ x||y : [a]〈b〉>. For readability, we write
[a] as a primitive modality, using the proof rules (1) from Section 2. When [a]
is defined in terms of 〈a〉, these proof rules are easily derived via a combination
of the rules for 〈a〉 and negation. We also avoid including extraneous assertions
in the sequents in Fig. 5. The full derivation involves evident weakenings of
the written sequents.
We end this section with the main results. For assumable (possibly infinite)
Γ and arbitrary ∆ we write Γ `b ∆ to mean that there exist finite subsets
Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that the sequent Γ′ =⇒ ∆′ (which is admissible) is
derivable in the basic proof system. Similarly, we write Γ `f ∆ to mean that
for some finite subsets Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆ the sequent Γ′ =⇒ ∆′ is derivable
in the full proof system. Trivially Γ `b ∆ implies Γ `f ∆.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of the full proof system) If Γ`f∆ thenΓ |=∆.
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PROOF. We prove, by induction on derivations, that if Γ =⇒ ∆ is derivable
in the full proof system then Γ |= ∆. We consider three illustrative cases
involving action assertions.
Case 1. Suppose we have derived Γ =⇒ f(p1, . . . , pk) c→ rh(~p, ~q), ∆ as a
result of an application of the (f
c→R)h rule. Then, by the induction hypothesis,
we have Γ |= pi ahij→ qhij, ∆, for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ mhi; and
Γ |= pi bhij9 , ∆, for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ nhi. We must show that
Γ |= f(p1, . . . , pk) c→rh(~p, ~q), ∆. Consider then any model T and environment
γ such that, for all J ∈ Γ, it holds that T |=γ J and, for all K ∈ ∆, it
holds that T 6|=γ K. We must show that T |=γ f(p1, . . . , pk) c→ rh(~p, ~q). By
the induction hypothesis, T |=γ pi ahij→ qhij and T |=γ pi bhij9 , for all relevant
i, j; i.e. γ(pi)
ahij→ T γ(qij) and γ(pi) bhij9T . Thus, by Definition 3.1, we have
γ(f(p1, . . . , pk))
c→T γ(rh(~p, ~q)), i.e. T |=γ f(p1, . . . , pk) c→rh(~p, ~q), as required.
Case 2. Suppose we have derived Γ, f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→x =⇒ ∆, as a result of
an application of the (f
c→L) rule. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we have
Γ[rh(~p, ~y)/x], {pi ahij→ yij}1≤i≤k1≤j≤mhi , {pi
bhij9}1≤i≤k1≤j≤nhi |= ∆[rh(~p, ~y)/x] ,
for each h with 1 ≤ h ≤ lfc. We must show that Γ, f(p1, . . . , pk) c→x |= ∆.
Consider any model T and environment γ such that T |=γ f(p1, . . . , pk) c→ x
and, for all J ∈ Γ, it holds that T |=γ J . We must show that T |=γ K for some
K ∈ ∆. As T |=γ f(p1, . . . , pk) c→x, we have γ(f(p1, . . . , pk)) c→T γ(x). So, by
Definition 3.1, there exists h with 1 ≤ h ≤ lfc, and there exist {tij}1≤j≤ni1≤i≤k such
that: for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ mi, it holds that γ(pi) ahij→ T tij;
for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, it holds that γ(pi) bhij9T ; and
γ(x) = r(γ(~p),~t). Define γ′ = γ[~y 7→ ~t]. Then γ(x) = γ′(rh(~p, ~y)), because
none of the ~y variables occurs in ~p. Also, for every J ∈ Γ ∪∆, none of the ~y
variables occurs in J , so T |=γ′ J [rh(~p, ~y)/x] if and only if T |=γ J . Therefore:
for all J ∈ Γ, it holds that T |=γ′ J [rh(~p, ~y)/x]; for all relevant i, j, it holds that
T |=γ′ pi ahij→ yij; and, for all relevant i, j, it holds that T |=γ′ pi bhij9 . Thus, by
the induction hypothesis, there exists K ∈ ∆ such that T |=γ′ K[rh(~p, ~y)/x].
So indeed T |=γ K.
Case 3. Suppose we have derived Γ[q/x] =⇒ ∆[q/x] as a result of an applica-
tion of the (
c→Cut) rule. Then, by the induction hypothesis, Γ, p c→x |= ∆ and
Γ[q/x] |= p c→q, ∆[q/x]. We must show that Γ[q/x] |= ∆[q/x]. Accordingly,
consider any model T and environment γ. Suppose, for contradiction that:
for all J ∈ Γ, it holds that T |=γ J [q/x]; and, for all K ∈ ∆, it holds that
T 6|=γ K[q/x]. Then, because Γ[q/x] |= p c→q, ∆[q/x], we have T |=γ p c→ q.
Define γ′ = γ[x 7→ γ(q)]. Then, for all J ∈ Γ, it holds that T |=γ′ J ; and, for
all K ∈ ∆, it holds that T 6|=γ′ K. So, as Γ, p c→x |= ∆, we have T 6|=γ′ p c→x.
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But x 6∈ Vars(p), because Γ, p a→ x is assumable, so γ′(p) = γ(p). Therefore
T 6|=γ p c→q. This gives the desired contradiction.
Remaining cases. These are similar, and are left to the reader. 2
Theorem 2 (Completeness of the basic proof system) If Γ is assum-
able and Γ |= ∆ then Γ `b ∆.
The proof of this theorem is given in Section 5 below.
We state two immediate corollaries of Theorems 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 (Equivalence of the basic and full systems) Γ `b ∆ if and
only if Γ `f ∆.
Thus all the proof rules in Fig. 4 are admissible in the basic system, including,
in particular, the (Cut) and (
c→Cut) rules. It would be interesting to obtain
a syntactic proof of this fact. We have not carried out such a proof, but we
have checked that the “local” proof reductions all go through. Interestingly,
these local reductions confirm the naturalness of including the (
c→Cut) rule as
primitive in conjunction with (Cut).
Corollary 2 (Compactness) If Γ |= ∆ then there exist finite subsets Γ′ ⊆ Γ
and ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that Γ′ |= ∆′.
5 Proof of completeness
This entire section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 2. As usual we prove
the contrapositive. Suppose that Γ0 6`b ∆0 where Γ0 is assumable, and where,
for convenience in the proof, we assume, without loss of generality, that there
are infinitely many variables not contained in Vars(Γ0∪∆0). We shall construct
a model Tc together with an environment γc showing that Γ0 6|= ∆0.
To help construct the model, we define a sequence of 4-tuples (Γi,∆i, σi, Di),
for i ≥ 0. In doing so, we ensure that Γi is assumable and that Γi 6`b ∆i. The
sequence is constructed by eventually breaking down all compound assertions
in Γi (resp. ∆i) into components that witness their truth (resp. falsity) in the
constructed model. This much will be familiar to anyone who has previously
seen a direct proof of completeness for a cut-free sequent calculus or tableau
system. In our case, there are added complications to do with maintaining
the assumability of Γi. To deal with this, we simultaneously build substitution
functions σi (see Section 3) recording the sequence of term substitutions made
when decomposing action assertions in the process of generating Γi and ∆i
from Γ0 and ∆0. We also record the domains Di ⊆ Vars on which these
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substitution functions are nontrivial. The main technical difficulty is to show
that the sequence of substitution functions converges to a limiting substitution
function, required to define the environment γc, see Lemma 5.7.
In defining the sequence, we write Ui for the set
⋃
j≤iVars(Γj ∪∆j), and Vi for
Ui\Di. We also write  for an empty vector (of process terms).
We already have Γ0 and ∆0. Define σ0 to be the identify function, and D0 = ∅.
To define the rest of the sequence we use a “scheduling” set. Let {τ0, τ1, . . . }
be an enumeration of all 3-tuples (J, ~q, m), where J is an assertion, ~q is a
(possibly empty) vector of process terms and m ≥ 0, so that each such 3-tuple
appears infinitely often in the enumeration. The purpose of these 3-tuples is to
record, in a convenient (though somewhat redundant) format, each possible
way of decomposing a goal into new subgoals using basic proof rules. The
first component represents the assertion decomposed by a rule. The second
component is the sequence of term substitutions used in the decomposition.
The third component, if 0, signifies a left rule and, if ≥ 1, signifies a right
rule, with the higher numbers being used to enumerate the rules (f
c→R)1, . . . ,
(f
c→R)lfc . The precise way in which all this information is used will be clarified
by the construction below.
Define Γi+1 = Γi, ∆i+1 = ∆i, σi+1 = σi and Di+1 = Di, unless one of the
following conditions holds:
• τi = (p :¬A, , 0) and p :¬A ∈ Γi, in which case ∆i+1 = ∆i ∪ {p :A};
• τi = (p :A ∧B, , 0) and p :A∧B ∈ Γi, in which case Γi+1 = Γi∪{p :A, p :B};
• τi = (p : 〈a〉A, , 0) and p : 〈a〉A ∈ Γi, in which case Γi+1 = Γi∪{p a→x, x :A}
where x is a chosen variable not contained in Ui;
• τi = (p a9, q, 0), and p a9 ∈ Γi and also Vars(q) ⊆ Vi, in which case ∆i+1 =
∆i ∪ {p a→q};
• τi = (f(p1, . . . , pk) c→x, , 0) and f(p1, . . . , pk) c→x ∈ Γi, in which case:
Γi+1 = (Γi\{f(p1, . . . , pk) c→x})[rh(~p, ~y)/x] ∪
{pi′
ahi′j→ yi′j}1≤i′≤k1≤j≤mhi′ ∪ {pi′
bhi′j9 }1≤i′≤k1≤j≤nhi′
∆i+1 = ∆i[rh(~p, ~y)/x]
σi+1 = z 7→ (σi(z))[rh(~p, ~y)/x]
Di+1 = Di ∪ {x}.
where ~y is a chosen vector of distinct variables not contained in Ui and h is
chosen with 1 ≤ h ≤ lfc so that Γi+1 6`b∆i+1;
• τi = (p :¬A, , 1) and p :¬A ∈ ∆i, in which case Γi+1 = Γi ∪ {p :A};
• τi = (p :A∧B, , 1) and p :A∧B ∈ ∆i, in which case ∆i+1 = ∆i ∪ {p :A} if
Γi 6`b p :A, ∆i, and ∆i+1 = ∆i ∪ {p :B} otherwise;
• τi = (p : 〈a〉A, q, 1) and p : 〈a〉A ∈ ∆i and also Vars(q) ⊆ Vi, in which case if
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Γi 6`b q :A, ∆i then ∆i+1 = ∆i ∪ {q :A}, otherwise ∆i+1 = ∆i ∪ {p a→q}.
• τi = (p a9, , 1) and p a9 ∈ ∆i, in which case Γi+1 = Γi ∪ {p a→x} where x is
a chosen variable not contained in Ui;
• τi = (f(p1, . . . , pk) c→ rh(~p, ~q), ~q, h), where 1 ≤ h ≤ lfc, and Vars(~q) ⊆ Vi,
and also f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→rh(~p, ~q) ∈ ∆i, in which case: if there exist i′, j with
1 ≤ i′ ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ mhi′ such that Γi 6`b pi′
ahi′j→ qi′j, ∆i then ∆i+1 =
∆i ∪ {pi′
ahi′j→ qi′j} for a chosen such i′, j; otherwise ∆i+1 = ∆i ∪ {pi′
bhi′j9 } for
a chosen i′, j with 1 ≤ i′ ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ nhi′ such that Γi 6`b pi′
bhi′j9 , ∆i;
where, in the action assertion cases, it is assumed that the rules in R with
operator f and action c have the form in (4) of Section 4, and that the vectors
~y and ~q have the appropriate length. (Similar assumptions are made below
without further comment.)
Curiously, in order to establish that the definition above is good, we first need
a simple proof-theoretic lemma.
Lemma 5.1 The weakening rules (WkL) and (WkR) are admissible in the
basic proof system.
PROOF. A straightforward induction on the structure of derivations.
Lemma 5.2 The sequence (Γi,∆i, σi, Di) is well defined, each Γi is assumable
and Γi 6`b ∆i.
PROOF. We prove by induction on i that: (Γi,∆i, σi, Di) is well defined; Γi
is assumable; Γi 6`b ∆i, and there are infinitely many variables not contained
in Ui. The base case i = 0 is trivial. For i > 0, the result is also trivial if
none of the τi−1 clauses applies. If one of the τi−1 clauses does apply, then
the proof splits into a case analysis, one for each clause. In each case the
argument is similar. We illustrate the general pattern, by considering the two
most interesting cases.
Case 1: τi = (f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→x, , 0). We give the argument for this case in
detail. For each h with 1 ≤ h ≤ lfc, define:
Γ′h = (Γi−1\{f(p1, . . . , pk) c→x})[rh(~p, ~y)/x] ∪
{pi′
ahij′→ yi′j}1≤i′≤k1≤j≤mhi ∪ {pi′
bhi′j9 }1≤i′≤k1≤j≤nhi′
∆′h = ∆i−1[rh(~p, ~y)/x]
selecting the yi′j from the infinitely many variables not contained in Ui−1. We
show that each Γ′h is assumable. Conditions (A1) and (A2) are immediate.
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For the well-foundedness of the Γ′
h
relation, suppose, for contradiction, that
. . .Γ′
h
z2Γ′
h
z1Γ′
h
z0 is a descending sequence of variables. For any l ≥ 1, it
holds that zl ∈ Vars(Γi−1)\{x} (note that z0 may be one of the yi′j variables).
For variables z, z′ ∈ Vars(Γi−1)\{x}, it holds that z′Γ′
h
z iff: either z′Γi−1 z;
or z′Γi−1xΓi−1z. Thus, it holds that . . .
+
Γi−1z3
+
Γi−1z2
+
Γi−1z1, contradicting
the well-foundedness of Γi−1 . So Γ
′
h is indeed assumable.
Next, suppose, for contradiction, that Γ′h `b ∆′h for each h. Then there exist
finite subsets Γ′′h ⊆ Γ′h and ∆′′h ⊆ ∆′h such that, each sequent Γ′′h =⇒ ∆′′h is
derivable. Define
Γ†i−1 = {J ∈ Γi−1 | for some h, J [rh(~p, ~y)/x] ∈ Γ′′h}
∆†i−1 = {J ∈ ∆i−1 | for some h, J [rh(~p, ~y)/x] ∈ ∆′′h}
Γ′′′h = Γ
†
i−1[rh(~p, ~y)/x] ∪ {pi′
ahi′j→ yi′j}1≤i′≤k1≤j≤mhi ∪ {pi′
bhi′j9 }1≤i′≤k1≤j≤nhi′
∆′′′h = ∆
†
i−1[rh(~p, ~y)/x]
Then Γ†i−1 and ∆
†
i−1 are both finite sets (because, for any assertion K, there
are only finitely many assertions J that satisfy J [rh(~p, ~y)/x] = K). Thus
Γ′′′h and ∆
′′′
h are also finite. Also Γ
†
i−1, f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→ x is assumable be-
cause it is a subset of Γi−1, and Γ′′′h is assumable because it is a subset of
Γ′h. Moreover, Γ
′′′
h ⊇ Γ′′h and ∆′′′h ⊇ ∆′′h. So, each sequent Γ′′′h =⇒ ∆′′′h is deriv-
able, by the admissibility of weakening. However, together these sequents form
the premises for an application of the (f
c→L) rule, with concluding sequent
Γ†i−1, f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→x =⇒ ∆†i−1. Because Γ†i−1, f(p1, . . . , pk) c→x ⊆ Γi−1 and
∆†i−1 ⊆ ∆i−1, it follows that Γi−1 `b ∆i−1, which contradicts the induction
hypothesis.
We have shown that there exists h such that Γ′h 6`b∆′h. Thus (Γi,∆i, σi, Di) is
well-defined with, for a chosen such h,
Γi = Γ
′
h σi = z 7→ (σi−1(z))[rh(~p, ~y)/x]
∆i = ∆
′
h Di = Di−1 ∪ {x}.
We have already established that Γi is assumable, and we have ensured that
Γi 6`b ∆i. Also Ui = Ui−1 ∪ {yi′j}1≤i≤k1≤j≤mhi , so clearly there are infinitely many
variables not in Ui. This completes case 1.
Case 2: τi = (f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→ rh(~p, ~q), ~q, h), where 1 ≤ h ≤ lfc. We have
f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→ rh(~p, ~q) ∈ ∆i−1 where Vars(~q) ⊆ Vi−1. For each i′, j with
1 ≤ i′ ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ mhi′ define:
Γ′i′j = Γi−1 ∆
′
i′j = ∆i−1, pi′
ahi′j→ qi′j.
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Also, for each i′, j with 1 ≤ i′ ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ nhi′ define:
Γ′′i′j = Γi−1 ∆
′′
i′j = ∆i−1, pi′
bhi′j9
By the induction hypothesis, each Γ′i′j and ∆
′′
i′j is assumable.
Suppose, for contradiction, that Γ′i′j `b ∆′i′j and Γ′′i′j `b ∆′′i′j, in every case.
Then, using the admissibility of weakening, as in the treatment of case 1
above, we have, by an application of the (f
c→R)h rule, that Γi−1 `b ∆i−1,
contradicting the induction hypothesis.
Thus: either Γ′i′j 6`b ∆′i′j for some i′, j with 1 ≤ i′ ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ mhi′ ; or
Γ′′i′j 6`b ∆′′i′j for some i′, j with 1 ≤ i′ ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ nhi′ . In the first case,
(Γi,∆i, σi, Di) is well-defined with Γi = Γ
′
i′j and ∆i = ∆
′
i′j for a chosen i
′j such
that Γ′i′j 6`b ∆′i′j. If the first case does not apply, then (Γi,∆i, σi, Di) is well-
defined with Γi = Γ
′′
i′j and ∆i = ∆
′′
i′j for a chosen i
′j such that Γ′′i′j 6`b ∆′′i′j.
In either case it holds that Γi is assumable and Γi 6`b ∆i. Also, because
Vars(~q) ⊆ Vi−1, we have Ui = Ui−1. So, by the induction hypothesis, there
are indeed infinitely many variables not contained in Ui. This completes the
argument for case 2.
Remaining cases. These are similar, and are left to the reader. 2
Lemma 5.3
(1) Di ⊆ Ui and Di ⊆ Di+1.
(2) z 6∈ Di implies σi(z) = z.
(3) z ∈ Ui implies Vars(σi(z)) ⊆ Vi.
(4) Vars(Γi ∪∆i) ⊆ Vi.
(5) If j ≥ i then σj = σj ◦ σi.
(6) If j ≥ i and J ∈ Γi then either σj(J) ∈ Γj or J is p c→x with x ∈ Dj.
(7) If j ≥ i and J ∈ ∆i then σj(J) ∈ ∆j.
PROOF. Statements (1)–(4) are proved by induction on i. We omit the easy
arguments. Statements (5)–(7) are proved by induction on j − i.
For (5), suppose j = i. If z 6∈ Ui then σi(z) = z, by (1) and (2), so σi(σi(z)) =
σi(z). If z ∈ Ui then, by (3), Vars(σi(z)) ⊆ Vi = Ui\Di, so σi(σi(z)) = σi(z),
by (2), because σi is a term homomorphism. Thus indeed σi ◦ σi = σi.
If j − i > 0 then we have σj−1 ◦ σi = σj−1, by the induction hypothesis.
In the case that σj = σj−1, the result is immediate. Otherwise σj(z) =
σj−1(z)[rh(~p, ~y)/x] for some term rh(~p, ~y) and variable x. So:
σj(σi(z)) = σj−1(σi(z))[rh(~p, ~y)/x] = σj−1(z)[rh(~p, ~y)/x] = σj(z).
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Thus indeed σj ◦ σi = σj.
For (6), suppose J ∈ Γi. By (4), Vars(J) ⊆ Vi. Thus, by (2), σi(J) = J . Thus
the base case, j = i, is trivial.
If j − i > 0 then, by the induction hypothesis, either σj−1(J) ∈ Γj−1 or J is
p
a→z with z ∈ Dj−1. In the latter case z ∈ Dj and we are done. In the former,
we have σj−1(J) ∈ Γj−1, and we may assume that J is not of the form p a→ z
with z ∈ Dj−1. There are now many subcases. If σj = σj−1 then, however
Γj is constructed, we have Γj−1 ⊆ Γj. So indeed σj(J) ∈ Γj. Otherwise we
have σj = z 7→ (σj−1(z))[rh(~p, ~y)/x] and Dj = Dj−1 ∪ {x}. There are now
three possibilities. If J is of the form p
a→x, then we have x ∈ Dj as required.
The second possibility is that J is p
a→ z for some z 6= x. By the earlier
assumption, z 6∈ Dj−1 hence σj−1(z) = z 6= x. Thus σj−1(p) a→ z ∈ Γj−1 and
so σj−1(p)[rh(~p, ~y)/x]
a→ z ∈ Γj, i.e. indeed σj(J) ∈ Γj. The third possibility
is that J is not an action assertion. In this case, we have immediately that
σj−1(J)[rh(~p, ~y)/x] ∈ Γj, i.e. σj(J) ∈ Γj. This proves statement (6).
The proof of statement (7) is similar, but easier. 2
We now define the required model Tc. We write Dω for
⋃
iDi and Uω for
⋃
i Ui.
Define Vω = Uω\Dω. The model Tc is determined as the unique model such
that: |Tc| = {p | Vars(p) ⊆ Vω}; the operators are interpreted using the term
algebra structure; and x
a→TC q holds if and only if, for almost all j, it holds
that x
a→ q ∈ Γj (in which case q must be a process variable). The existence
and uniqueness of Tc is guaranteed by Proposition 3.2.
To define the required environment γc takes some work. The crucial fact here
is that the sequence (σi) of substitution functions converges to a limiting
substitution function, see Lemma 5.7 below. In order to prove this, it is useful
to assign ordinals < ωω to process terms. Recall that any such ordinal has a
unique normal form
ωl.nl + · · ·+ ω.n1 + n0, (5)
where l, nl, . . . , n0 are natural numbers with nl > 0 or l = 0. The order relation
on such ordinals is given by ωl.nl + · · ·+ ω.n1 + n0 > ωl′ .n′l′ + · · ·+ ω.n′1 + n′0
iff: either l > l′; or l = l′ and nm > n′m where m ≤ l is the greatest number
such that nm 6= n′m. We recall some basic operations of ordinal arithmetic. For
an ordinal α with normal form (5) above, the ordinals α+ 1, α+ ω and ω.α,
using the standard non-commutative ordinal operations, have normal forms:
α+ 1 = ωl.nl + · · ·+ ω.n1 + (n0 + 1)
α+ ω = ωl.nl + · · ·+ ω.(n1 + 1) + 0
ω.α = ωl+1.nl + · · ·+ ω2.n1 + ω.n0 + 0.
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To each term p we assign an ordinal |p|i < ωω, depending on the structure of
Γi. The assignment is defined by:
|x|i =
 0 if there is no assertion p
a→x in Γi
ω.|p|i if p a→x ∈ Γi
|f(p1, . . . , pk)|i = max(|p1|i, . . . , |pk|i) + 1.
This is easily shown to be well-defined using the well-foundedness of Γi . In
particular, when defining |x|i in the case that p a→ x ∈ Γi, we are given, by
the induction hypothesis, that |y|i is defined for all variables y occurring in p,
hence |p|i is indeed defined.
Lemma 5.4 For any term p(x1, . . . , xk):
(1) |ql|i ≤ |p(q1, . . . , qk)|i for each l ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
(2) |p(q1, . . . , qk)|i < max(|q1|i, . . . , |qk|i) + ω.
(3) If |ql|i ≤ |q′l|j, for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then |p(q1, . . . , qk)|i ≤ |p(q′1, . . . , q′k)|j.
PROOF. By easy inductions on the structure of p. 2
The next lemma is the reason for the particular choice of ordinal assigment.
Lemma 5.5 If x ∈ Di+1\Di, with σi+1(x) = rh(~p, ~y), then the following hold.
(1) |rh(~p, ~y)|i+1 < |x|i.
(2) If z ∈ Vi then |z[rh(~p, ~y)/x]|i+1 ≤ |z|i.
PROOF. If x ∈ Di+1\Di, with σi+1(x) = rh(~p, ~y), then there is some asser-
tion f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→x in Γi. So
Γi+1 = (Γi\{f(p1, . . . , pk) c→x})[rh(~p, ~y)/x] ∪
{pi′
ahi′j→ yi′j}1≤i′≤k1≤j≤mhi ∪ {pi′
bhi′j9 }1≤i′≤k1≤j≤nh′ .
Define V = {z | z+Γi x}. By the well-foundedness of Γi , we have x 6∈ V . We
show that, for any process term p with Vars(p) ⊆ V , it holds that |p|i+1 = |p|i.
To see this, observe that if z ∈ V and p a→z ∈ Γi then Vars(p) ⊆ V , so p a→z ∈
Γi+1. Conversely, suppose that z ∈ V and p a→ z ∈ Γi+1. Then z is not any of
the yi′j, because these are not in Ui, so not in V . Thus p must be p
′[rh(~p, ~y)/x]
where p′ a→ z ∈ Γi. But then Vars(p′) ⊆ V , so p′ = p′[rh(~p, ~y)/x] = p. Thus
p
a→ z ∈ Γi. We have shown that if y ∈ V then p a→ y ∈ Γi if and only if
p
a→y ∈ Γi+1. It is now straightforward from the definitions of | · |i+1 and | · |i
that Vars(p) ⊆ V implies |p|i+1 = |p|i.
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To prove statement (1), suppose that max(|p1|i, . . . , |pk|i) has the normal form
ωl.nl + · · ·+ ω.n1 + n0. Then
|x|i = ω.(max(|p1|i, . . . , |pk|i) + 1) = ωl+1.nl + · · ·+ ω2.n1 + ω.(n0 + 1) + 0.
By the fact shown above, we have |pi′|i = |pi′|i+1 for each i′ ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Thus,
for each yi′j, we have
|yi′j|i+1 = ω.|pi′|i+1 = ω.|pi′|i ≤ ωl+1.nl + · · ·+ ω2.n1 + ω.n0 + 0.
Clearly, we also have
|pi′|i+1 = |pi′|i ≤ ωl+1.nl + · · ·+ ω2.n1 + ω.n0 + 0.
So, by Lemma 5.4(2),
|rh(~p, ~y)|i+1 < max({|p1|i+1, . . . , |pk|i+1} ∪ {|yi′j′|i+1}1≤i′≤k1≤j≤mhi) + ω
≤ (ωl+1.nl + · · ·+ ω2.n1 + ω.n0 + 0) + ω
= ωl+1.nl + · · ·+ ω2.n1 + ω.(n0 + 1) + 0
= |x|i.
Thus indeed |rh(~p, ~y)|i+1 < |x|i.
Statement (2) is proved by induction over the well-founded relation Γi . There
are three possibilities for |z[rh(~p, ~y)/x]|i+1.
In the first case, z = x, in which case |z[rh(~p, ~y)/x]|i+1 = |rh(~p, ~y)|i+1 < |x|i =
|z|i, by statement (1).
In the second case, z 6= x and z does not appear in any assertion q a→ z in
Γi+1. Then z does not appear in any assertion q
′ a→ z in Γi, for otherwise
q′[rh(~p, ~y)/x]
a→z would be in Γi+1. Thus we have
|z[rh(~p, ~y)/x]|i+1 = |z|i+1 = 0 = |z|i.
In the third case, z 6= x and z does appear in some assertion q a→ z in Γi+1.
As z ∈ Vi, it is not equal to any of the yi′j, so there must be an assertion
q′ a→z ∈ Γi with q = q′[rh(~p, ~y)/x]. For each z′ ∈ Vars(q′), we have z′Γi z, so,
by the induction hypothesis, |z′[rh(~p, ~y)/x]|i+1 ≤ |z′|i. Then, by Lemma 5.4(3),
we have |q′[rh(~p, ~y)/x]|i+1 ≤ |q′|i, i.e. |q|i+1 ≤ |q′|i. But then
|z[rh(~p, ~y)/x]|i+1 = ω.|q|i+1 ≤ ω.|q′|i = |z|i.
Thus, in all three cases, |z[rh(~p, ~y)/x]|i+1 ≤ |z|i. 2
Lemma 5.6 If x ∈ Vi and i ≤ j then |σj(x)|j ≤ |x|i.
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PROOF. By induction on j − i. When j = i, by Lemma 5.3(2), σj(x) = x.
If j − i > 0 then, by the induction hypothesis, |σj−1(x)|j−1 ≤ |x|i.
If σj = σj−1, then it is easily checked that each possible case for the def-
inition of Γj has the property that |z|j = |z|j−1 for all z ∈ Vj−1. Thus,
by Lemma 5.4(3), for all p with Vars(p) ⊆ Vj−1, we have |p|j = |p|j−1. So
|σj(x)|j = |σj−1(x)|j = |σj−1(x)|j−1 ≤ |x|i.
Alternatively, there exists z ∈ Dj\Dj−1, with σj(x) = σj−1(x)[rh(~p, ~y)/z] By
Lemma 5.5(2), we have, for each z′ ∈ Vars(σj−1(x)) that |z′[rh(~p, ~y)/z]|j ≤
|z′|j−1. So, by Lemma 5.4(3), |σj−1(x)[rh(~p, ~y)/z]|j ≤ |σj−1(x)|j−1. Therefore
|σj(x)|j = |σj−1(x)[rh(~p, ~y)/z]|j ≤ |σj−1(x)|j−1 ≤ |x|i.
Thus indeed |σj(x)|j ≤ |x|i. 2
Lemma 5.7 For every variable x, there exists j such that σj′(x) = σj(x) for
all j′ ≥ j.
PROOF. For x 6∈ Uω, the statement is trivial. Otherwise we prove: for all
ordinals α < ωω, and all x ∈ Uω, if there exists i with x ∈ Vars(Γi ∪∆i) and
|x|i = α then there exists jx such that σj′(x) = σjx(x) for all j′ ≥ jx. The
proof is by transfinite induction on α.
Suppose that x ∈ Vars(Γi ∪∆i) and |x|i = α. There are two cases.
If x 6∈ Dj for all j, then the result is trivial, as σj(x) = x for all j.
Otherwise, x ∈ Dj+1\Dj for some j. Moreover, j ≥ i because, by Lemma 5.3(4),
for j′ > j, we have x 6∈ Vars(Γ′j ∪ ∆j′). By, Lemma 5.6, we have |x|j ≤
|x|i = α. Also, σj+1(x) = rh(~p, ~y). By, Lemmas 5.4(1) and 5.5(1), for all z ∈
Vars(rh(~p, ~y)), we have |z|j+1 ≤ |rh(~p, ~y)|j+1 < |x|j ≤ α. So, by the induction
hypothesis, for each such variable z, there exists jz such that σj′(z) = σjz(z) for
all j′ ≥ jz. There are only finitely many variables z1, . . . , zm in Vars(rh(~p, ~y)).
Define jx = max(jz1 , . . . , jzm , j + 1). Take any j
′ ≥ jx. We must show that
σj′(x) = σjx(x).
For all variables z ∈ Vars(rh(~p, ~y)), it holds that σj′(z) = σjx(z). So, as σj′
and σjx are homomorphisms, σj′(rh(~p, ~y)) = σjx(rh(~p, ~y)). Moreover, because
j′ ≥ j + 1, we have σj′ = σj′ ◦ σj+1, by Lemma 5.3(5). Thus indeed:
σj′(x) = σj′(σj+1(x)) = σj′(rh(~p, ~y)) = σjx(rh(~p, ~y)) = σjx(σj+1(x)) = σjx(x).
2
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Lemma 5.7 allows us to define the limiting substitution function, σω, by:
σω(x) = the unique p such that σi(x) = p for almost all i.
Lemma 5.8
(1) z 6∈ Dω implies σω(z) = z.
(2) z ∈ Uω implies Vars(σω(z)) ⊆ Vω.
(3) σω = σω ◦ σi.
(4) If J ∈ Γi then either σω(J) ∈ Γj for almost all j, or J is p a→ x with
x ∈ Dω.
(5) If J ∈ ∆i then σω(J) ∈ ∆j for almost all j
PROOF. All statements follow easily from the definition of σω, using the
analogous statements for the various σi in Lemma 5.3. 2
We can now finally define the required environment. Define γc(x) to be σω(x)
if x ∈ Uω and an arbitrary element of |Tc| otherwise. This is indeed an envi-
ronment for Tc, by Lemma 5.8(2) above.
Lemma 5.9
(1) J ∈ Γi implies Tc |=γc J .
(2) J ∈ ∆i implies Tc 6|=γc J .
PROOF. First the lemma is proved for assertions p
c→q and p c9, by induction
on the structure of σω(p).
Case 1: p
c→ x ∈ Γi. If x 6∈ Dω then, by Lemma 5.8(1&4), it holds that
σω(p)
c→x ∈ Γj for almost all j ≥ i. But then σω(p) must be a variable y, as
otherwise for some τj of the form (σω(p)
c→x, , 0) we would have x ∈ Dj+1, a
contradiction. So y
c→Tc x, by the definition of Tc. Thus indeed Tc |=γc p c→x.
Otherwise, if x ∈ Dω then for some j ≥ i, we have x ∈ Dj+1\Dj. Thus, by
Lemma 5.3(6), σj(p)
c→x ∈ Γj and τj = (σj(p) c→x, , 0) where σj(p) has the
form f(p1, . . . , pk). So, for some h, we have
{pi′
ahi′j→ yi′j}1≤i′≤k1≤j≤mhi′ ∪ {pi′
bhi′j9 }1≤i′≤k1≤j≤nhi′ ⊆ Γj+1.
By Lemma 5.8(3), σω(p) = σω(σj(p)) = f(σω(p1), . . . , σω(pk)). So, by the
induction hypothesis, Tc |=γc pi′
ahi′j→ yi′j and Tc |=γc pi′
bhi′j9 , for all appropriate
i′, j. Then, as Tc is a model of R, we have Tc |=γc f(p1, . . . , pk) c→ rh(~p, ~y).
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By Lemma 5.8(3), γc(x) = σω(x) = σω(σj+1(x)) = σω(rh(~p, ~y)). Thus indeed
Tc |=γc p c→x.
Case 2: p
c→r ∈ ∆i. By Lemma 5.8(5), σω(p) c→σω(r) ∈ ∆j for almost all j.
Suppose, for contradiction, that Tc |=γc p c→r, i.e. that σω(p) c→Tc σω(r).
If σω(p) is a variable x then x
c→Tc σω(r), so, by the definition of Tc, we have
that σω(r) is a variable y and x
c→y ∈ Γj for almost all j. But, for almost all
j, we also have x
c→y ∈ ∆j. Thus, by the ( c→Ax) rule, Γj `b ∆j for almost all
j, a contradiction.
If σω(p) = f(p1, . . . , pk) then f(p1, . . . , pk)
c→Tc σω(r). So there exist h and ~q,
with Vars(~q) ⊆ Vω, such that σω(r) = rh(~p, ~q) and:
(1) for all i′, j′ with 1 ≤ i′ ≤ k and 1 ≤ j′ ≤ mhi′ , pi′
ahi′j′→ Tc qi′j′ ; and
(2) for all i′, j′ with 1 ≤ i′ ≤ k and 1 ≤ j′ ≤ nhi′ , pi′
bhi′j′9 Tc .
Now σω(p)
c→ σω(r) ∈ ∆j and Vars(~q) ⊆ Vj, for almost all j. So for some
τj = (σω(p)
c→σω(r), ~q, h) it holds that either pi′
ahi′j′→ qi′j′ ∈ ∆j+1 or pi′
bhi′j′9 ∈
∆j+1 for some suitable i
′, j′. Then, by the induction hypothesis, either Tc 6|=γc
pi′
ahi′j′→ qi′j′ or Tc 6|=γc pi′
bhi′j′9 . Thus either way contradicts 1 or 2 above.
We have shown that Tc |=γc p c→ r, whatever the structure of σω(p). This
completes case 2.
Remaining cases. There are two more cases: one for assertions p
c9∈ Γi
and one for assertions p
c9∈ ∆i. These are proved using similar, though easier,
arguments to the above.
Having now established the lemma for action and inaction assertions, it re-
mains to deal with logic assertions p :A. For such assertions, the proof is by
induction on the structure of A.
Case 1: p : 〈a〉A ∈ Γi. For almost all j we have σω(p) : 〈a〉A ∈ Γj. Thus
for some τj = (σω(p) : 〈a〉A, , 0) we have {σω(p) a→ x, x :A} ⊆ Γj+1. Then
Tc |=γc σω(p) a→x and Tc |=γc x :A, the latter by the induction hypothesis. So
Tc |=γc p : 〈a〉A.
Case 2: p : 〈a〉A ∈ ∆i. For almost all j we have σω(p) : 〈a〉A ∈ ∆j. Suppose,
for contradiction, that Tc |=γc p : 〈a〉A. Thus there exists q with Vars(q) ⊆ Vω,
such that σω(p)
a→Tc q and Tc |=γc q :A. For almost all j, Vars(q) ⊆ Vj. Thus
for some τj of the form (σω(p) : 〈a〉A, q, 1) we have that either q :A ∈ ∆j+1 or
σω(p)
a→q ∈ ∆j+1. In the first case, by the induction hypothesis, Tc 6|=γc q :A.
In the second case Tc 6|=γc σω(p) a→ q, i.e. σω(p) 6 a→Tc q. Either alternative
contradicts the selection of q. Thus indeed Tc 6|=γc p : 〈a〉A.
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Remaining cases. The cases for the propositional connectives are straight-
forward, and thus omitted. 2
It follows immediately from the lemma above that Γ0 6|= ∆0. This completes
the proof of Theorem 2.
6 The intended model and ω-completeness
The completeness theorem is relative to entailment over the class of all models
of R. Usually one is interested in truth in the intended model TR, defined after
Proposition 3.2. In this section we give conditions under which useful forms
of completeness do indeed hold relative to TR.
The first such completeness theorem is motivated by the fact, remarked upon
after Proposition 3.4, that, in any model, the state interpreting a closed process
p is bisimilar to the state p in TR. As we shall see, the proof system is complete
for deriving the truth in TR of sequents containing only closed process terms.
Actually, a stronger result holds. It is enough that every process variable in a
sequent is forced to represent a state interpreting a closed process. A simple
syntactic condition guarantees that this is the case. We say that a pair of sets of
assertions, (Γ,∆), is closed generated if Γ is assumable and also every variable
x ∈ Vars(Γ∪∆) appears in an assertion of the form p a→x ∈ Γ. This condition
ensures that each minimal variable x under Γ appears in an assertion of the
form p
a→ x ∈ Γ where p is closed, and thus, by the well-foundedness of Γ,
each variable is a descendent of a closed process term.
Theorem 3 If (Γ,∆) is closed generated and Γ |=TR ∆ then Γ ` ∆.
Here, in view of Corollary 1, we write Γ ` ∆ to mean Γ `b ∆ or Γ `f ∆.
PROOF. Suppose that (Γ0,∆0) is closed-generated and Γ0 6` ∆0. Let Tc
be the model constructed in the proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 5.9, we have
Γ0 6|=Tc ∆0. We use the construction of Tc from Section 5 to show that Tc = TR.
First, observe that, by a straightforward induction on i, each (Γi,∆i) is closed-
generated. One then proves easily, by well-founded induction on Γi that, for
each x ∈ Vars(Γi∪∆i), it holds that |x|i > 0, where |x|i is the ordinal assigned
in Section 5.
Next, we show that x ∈ Uω implies that σω(x) is closed. Suppose for contra-
diction that there exists some x ∈ Uω such that Vars(σω(x)) 6= ∅. Using the
ordinal assigment, select x and i with |x|i minimal such that x ∈ Vars(Γi∪∆)
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and Vars(σω(x)) 6= ∅. As (Γi,∆i) is closed-generated, there is some assertion
q
c→ x ∈ Γi. By Lemma 5.8(4): either (i) x ∈ Dω; or (ii) σω(q) c→ x ∈ Γj for
almost all j.
In case (i), there exists j ≥ i such that x ∈ Dj+1\Dj, where σj(q) c→ x ∈ Γi
and σj+1 = z 7→ (σj(z))[rh(~p, ~y)/x]. By Lemmas 5.4(1), 5.5(1), and 5.6, for
each z ∈ Vars(rh(~p, ~y)), we have
|z|j+1 ≤ |rh(~p, ~y)|j+1 < |x|j = |σj(x)|j ≤ |x|i.
By the minimality assumption on |x|i, for each such z, it holds that σω(z) is
closed. Thus σω(rh(~p, ~y)) is closed. By Lemma 5.8(3), we have
σω(x) = σω(σj+1(x)) = σω(rh(~p, ~y)).
Thus σω(x) is closed, contradicting the choice of x.
In case (ii), σω(q)
c→x ∈ Γj for almost all j, and x 6∈ Dω. Then σω(q) must be a
variable y, as otherwise for some τj of the form (σω(p)
c→x, , 0) we would have
x ∈ Dj+1, a contradiction. Therefore q is itself a variable z, with σω(z) = y.
But then, by the definition of the ordinal assignment, |x|i = ω.|z|i > |z|i,
with the latter inequality because 0 < |z|i < ωω. Thus, by the minimality
assumption on |x|i, we have σω(z) is closed, contradicting σω(z) = y.
We have proved that, for every x ∈ Uω, it holds that Vars(σω(x)) is closed.
Therefore, by Lemma 5.8(1), Uω = Dω. Thus Vω = ∅. So |Tc| is the set of
closed processes. By Proposition 3.2, it follows that Tc = TR. Thus indeed
Γ0 6|=TR ∆0. 2
Given Theorems 1 and 2, an equivalent statement to Theorem 3 is that, when
(Γ,∆) is closed-generated, then Γ |=TR ∆ implies Γ |= ∆. It is interesting to
note that conditions (A1) and (A2) on the assumability of Γ are essential for
this implication to hold. For example, we have that a.0
a→0 + 0 |=TR but not
that a.0
a→0+0 |=, because 0 and 0+0 have the same denotation in the model
obtained by quotienting TR by bisimilarity.
The restriction to closed generated consequences does not fully exploit the ex-
pressivity of sequents containing open terms. One would also like a complete-
ness result for sequents in which the variables need not derive from closed pro-
cesses. Indeed such sequents are used crucially to express the parametrized ver-
ification goals discussed in Section 1. What we seek is a form of ω-completeness,
i.e. completeness relative to all environments interpreting process variables as
closed processes in TR. In order to obtain such a result, it is necessary to make
some very mild expressivity assumptions on the GSOS system R. Recall the
definition of the transition system F of finite processes from Section 3.
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Definition 6.1 We say that R represents every finite process if, for every
u ∈ F there exists p ∈ TR such that u ∼ p.
To motivate this definition, let us consider what happens when R does not
represent every finite process. Accordingly, suppose that there exists some
finite process u ∈ F for which there is no p ∈ TR with u ∼ p. Let χ(u) be
the characteristic formula of u, given by Proposition 3.7(2). Then we have
|=TR x :¬(χ(u)). However, clearly 6` x :¬(χ(u)) because one can find models
in which states bisimilar to u do exist. Thus ω-completeness fails. Therefore,
a necessary condition for ω-completeness, for even the simplest non-closed-
generated sequents, is that R represents every finite process. Surprisingly,
this turns out to be a sufficient condition for ω-completeness to hold for a
very wide class of sequents.
Theorem 4 (ω-completeness) Suppose that R represents every finite pro-
cess. Then, for finite Γ, ∆ such that Γ is assumable and ∆ contains no action
assertions, Γ |=TR ∆ implies Γ ` ∆.
The condition that R represents every finite process is rather mild. For exam-
ple, it is satisfied by any process algebra containing prefix, zero and sum. 5
The restrictions on Γ and ∆ in Theorem 4 are necessary. The finiteness condi-
tion is required because the consequence relation ` is compact, whereas |=TR
need not be. For example, take R to be the GSOS system containing just the
prefix, zero and sum operators. Then it holds that |=TR {x : [a]n⊥ | n ≥ 0},
but it is clear that 6` {x : [a]n⊥ | n ≥ 0}, because one can find models con-
taining processes able to perform infinite sequences of a transitions. For an
example showing why ∆ is required to contain no action assertion, observe
that it possible to construct a GSOS system, containing the prefix and zero
operators, that represents every finite process and in which the only closed
process term bisimilar to the zero process is 0 itself (so there is necessarily no
sum operator). If R is such a system then {x : [a]⊥ | a ∈ Act} |=TR a.0 a→ x,
but the corresponding sequent is not provable, because one can find models
in which there are two distinct states bisimilar to 0. Note that this type of
counterexample does not work for those GSOS systems in which every finite
process is represented by an infinite number of distinct closed terms (such
as any system with prefix, zero and sum). It seems possible that, for such
systems, ω-completeness might hold for arbitrary finite ∆.
Theorem 4 is proved by establishing that, under the conditions of the theorem,
Γ 6|= ∆ implies Γ 6|=TR ∆. Suppose then that R represents every finite process
and that we have T and γ such that, for all J ∈ Γ, T |=γ J and, for all
K ∈ ∆, T 6|=γ K. We must define a TR-environment γ′ such that, for all
J ∈ Γ, TR |=γ′ J and, for all K ∈ ∆, TR 6|=γ′ K.
5 These operators are assumed present in the definition of GSOS system in [5].
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We shall define γ′ so that, for each x, it holds that γ′(x) ∼m γ(x) for some m
depending on x, using the m-th approximation to bisimilarity from Section 3.
To determine m we assign a depth, d(p), to each process term p by:
d(x) =
 d(p) + 1 if p
a→x ∈ Γ,
0 otherwise,
d(f(p1, . . . , pk)) = max{d(p1), . . . , d(pk)}.
It follows from the well-foundedness of Γ that d(p) is well-defined. Define
n = max({d(p) + 1 | p a→x ∈ Γ or p a9 ∈ Γ ∪∆} ∪
{d(p) + md(A) | p :A ∈ Γ ∪∆}),
using the finiteness of Γ and ∆. By a trivial induction on the structure of
terms, one sees that, for any term p, it holds that n ≥ d(p).
Lemma 6.2 There exists a TR-environment γ′ such that:
(1) γ′(p) ∼n−d(p) γ(p), and
(2) p
a→y ∈ Γ implies γ′(p) a→TR γ′(y).
PROOF. For eachm ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we define γ′(x) on variables x with d(x) =
m, assuming it already defined on variables y with d(y) < m. Moreover, we
ensure that: (i) property (1) holds for all p with Vars(p) ⊆ {y | d(y) ≤ m}; and
(ii) property (2) holds whenever d(y) ≤ m. Accordingly, let x be any variable
with d(x) = m.
When m = 0, by Proposition 3.6(1), there exists a finite process u ∈ Fn
such that γ(x) ∼n u. Because R represents every finite process, there exists
q ∈ TR such that q ∼ u. By Proposition 3.3, it follows that q ∼n γ(x). Define
γ′(x) = q. We thus have γ′(x) ∼n−d(x) γ(x). Also note that there is no assertion
p
a→x ∈ Γ because d(x) = 0.
Whenm > 0, we use as induction hypothesis that (i) holds whenm is replaced
by m− 1. As d(x) > 0, we have p a→x ∈ Γ for some p. So γ(p) a→T γ(x). But
d(p) = d(x) − 1 so, for all y ∈ Vars(p), we have d(y) < m. Thus, by the
induction hypothesis, γ′(p) ∼n−(d(x)−1) γ(p), i.e. γ′(p) ∼(n−d(x))+1 γ(p). As
γ(p)
a→T γ(x), there exists q ∈ |TR| such that γ′(p) a→TR q and q ∼n−d(x) γ(x).
Define γ′(x) = q. Thus we have γ′(x) ∼n−d(x) γ(x) and γ′(p) a→TR γ′(x)
We now have γ′ defined on all variables x with d(x) ≤ m. We must show
that (i) and (ii) hold. By the definition of γ′(x) above, we have ensured that
γ′(x) ∼n−d(x) γ(x) and also that p a→x ∈ Γ implies γ′(p) a→TR γ′(x). It remains
to show that γ′(p) ∼n−d(p) γ(p) for any p with Vars(p) ⊆ {x | d(x) ≤ m}.
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Consider any such p. Then, for each x ∈ Vars(p) we have γ′(x) ∼n−d(x) γ(x).
But d(x) ≤ d(p) so also γ′(x) ∼n−d(p) γ(x). Thus, by Proposition 3.4, indeed
γ′(p) ∼n−d(p) γ(p). 2
Lemma 6.3 For all J ∈ Γ, TR |=γ′ J and, for all K ∈ ∆, TR 6|=γ′ K.
PROOF. We consider the various cases in turn.
If p
a→x ∈ Γ then, by Lemma 6.2(2), γ′(p) a→TR γ′(x), i.e. TR |=γ′ p a→x.
If p
a9∈ Γ then T |=γ p a9, i.e. γ(p) a9T . By Lemma 6.2(1), γ′(p) ∼n−d(p) γ(p).
By the definition of n, we have n − d(p) ≥ 1. Thus, γ′(p) ∼1 γ(p). It follows
that γ′(p) a9TR , i.e. TR |=γ′ p a9.
If p :A ∈ Γ then T |=γ p :A, i.e. γ(p) T A. Therefore, by Lemma 6.2(1),
γ′(p) ∼n−d(p) γ(p). By the definition of n, we have n − d(p) ≥ md(A). Thus,
γ′(p) ∼md(A) γ(p). So, by Proposition 3.5, γ′(p) TR A, i.e. TR |=γ′ p :A.
The cases for inaction and logic assertions in ∆ are similar to the corresponding
cases for Γ above. 2
Lemma 6.3 states that Γ 6|=TR ∆. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
As far as we are aware, there is no precursor to Theorem 4 in the literature.
The closest work is that of Stirling, who, in his proof system for CCS [25],
used special sequents A,B ` C for stating parametrized goals of the form
x :A, y :B =⇒ x|y :C. Using such sequents, Stirling obtained completeness
for ordinary verification goals p :A. However, he did not obtain the complete-
ness of his proof system for the sequents A,B ` C. In our approach, sequents
expressing parametrized goals arise in a uniform way and are available for all
process operators in the language. Moreover, Theorem 4 shows that our proof
system is complete for establishing all such sequents.
7 Conclusions
Previous work on compositional proof systems for process algebras (see, e.g.,
[30,25,2]) has often involved ingenious ideas that work for the operators under
consideration. In this paper we have shown how such proof systems may be
derived in a uniform way for any GSOS system. Our use of GSOS systems
may be seen as analogous to that of [1], where it is shown how to derive
complete equational axiomatizations of bisimilarity from arbitrary GSOS rule
38
specifications. In this paper, we have pursued a similar programme for modal
properties rather than equations.
Crucial to our approach is the use of a sufficiently expressive form of sequent,
permitting the incorporation of operational semantics into the proof rules.
In addition to the general completeness and cut-elimination theorems, a par-
ticularly important improvement on previous work has been the proof of an
ω-completeness theorem for a wide class of sequents, including those express-
ing parametrized verification goals.
Regarding possible improvements to our work, there are several limitations
inherent in the use of GSOS systems. One is the restriction to a finite set of
actions. There are straightforward generalizations to infinite action sets which,
however, involve the use of infinitary rules. It would be interesting to develop
a natural class of finitary rules for dealing with infinite action sets, perhaps
by using proof rules based on an algebra of action terms. A further limitation
is that we have not included a recursion operator in the GSOS system. As
remarked in [5], any process defined by guarded recursion can be incorporated
by including a new process constant for the process and giving it explicit
operational rules. However, it would be better to include direct proof rules
for guarded recursion in the sequent calculus. Although the definition of such
an extension of our proof system is not difficult, it seems a nontrivial task to
extend our proof of completeness to cover it, although in principle it should
be possible to do so.
A severe practical limitation of our work is the use of Hennessy-Milner logic,
which is too weak to express interesting temporal properties of programs.
Since the research in this paper was first carried out, there has been significant
progress on the extension of the methods in this paper to richer logics, such
as Kozen’s modal µ-calculus [17]. This work is surveyed in Section 8 below.
More generally, the idea of deriving Gentzen-style rules from operational se-
mantics is by no means restricted to GSOS-specified process algebras. Indeed,
since the research in this paper was first carried out, there have been several
applications to richer process languages and other programming paradigms.
Once again, these are surveyed in Section 8 below.
8 Epilogue
The research in this paper was first presented at the 1995 IEEE Logic in
Computer Science conference, under the title: “Compositionality via cut-
elimination: Hennessy-Milner logic for an arbitrary GSOS” [23]. The choice
of title was unfortunate, as the slogan “compositionality via cut-elimination”
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is misleading. At the time of the original conference submission (December
1994), I was failing to distinguish between compositional and structural rea-
soning, and the original title was based on a conflation of the two. By the time
of the LICS conference (June 1995), I had realised my mistake, and I publicly
retracted the title during my talk. But that was too late for the proceedings
version! The introduction to the present paper presents what I believe is a cor-
rect account of compositional and structural reasoning and their relationship
to sequent calculus. Thus, in spite of the title of [23], the cut rule is essential
for compositional verification.
Instead, the significance of the admissibility of cut is twofold. First, it demon-
strates that the left and right rules for process operators properly complement
each other, and so justifies the formulation of these rules. Second, it shows that
structural reasoning alone suffices to establish any goal. It is unclear, however,
whether or not the admissibility of cut can (or even should) be maintained in
extensions of the proof system to richer logics and programming languages (for
example, the extensions discussed below). Indeed, even if cut is not admissible
in such systems, its admissibility in the system of this paper still amounts to
justification of the formulation of the rules. Of course, structural reasoning is
then no longer sufficient on its own. But this is rather a fact of life than a
problem. As discussed in Section 1, one anyway expects to use a combination
of reasoning methods in program verification.
The other main contributions of the original paper were:
(1) The notion of GSOS model.
(2) The use of sequent calculus as a formalism for process verification.
(3) The derivation of proof rules from operational semantics.
(4) The completeness and ω-completeness results.
We end by discussing these within the context of subsequent developments.
In [23], the notion of GSOS model was used purely as a technical tool, needed
to establish a general completeness result (Theorem 2 of the present paper).
Nevertheless, it seemed a natural notion. This was later substantiated by Turi
and Plotkin in their category-theoretic account of the operational and deno-
tational semantics of GSOS systems [27,28]. In their work, a GSOS system
gives rise to a monad on the category of transition systems with functional
bisimulations as morphisms. The algebras of this monad turn out to be exactly
the GSOS models in the sense of Definition 3.1.
The idea of using sequent calculus for process verification was proposed in-
dependently by Dam in [7], written at the same time as [23]. Dam was also
concerned with obtaining compositional proof systems allowing natural forms
of reasoning. However, in contrast to [23], Dam used the much more expres-
sive modal µ-calculus of Kozen [17], and concentrated on soundness results
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(which are nontrivial in that setting) rather than completeness results (which
are unachievable for the µ-calculus, see below).
There are two alternative approaches to extending the approach of this pa-
per to the modal µ-calculus. The most obvious is to include induction and
coinduction rules for least and greatest fixed points respectively. For example,
natural proof rules for the greatest-fixed-point operator are given by:
Γ, p :A[νX.A/X] =⇒ ∆
Γ, p : νX.A =⇒ ∆
Γ, x :B =⇒ x :A[B/X], ∆ Γ =⇒ p :B, ∆
Γ =⇒ p : νX.A, ∆
where, in the right-hand rule, x must not appear in the rule conclusion. The
right-hand rule is a coinduction rule, based on using a formula B, representing
a post-fixed point for the operator X 7→ A, as a coinduction hypothesis. Dual
rules are applicable to least fixed points.
Unfortunately, such rules on their own appear too weak to establish any in-
teresting properties of processes. The problem is that the induction and coin-
duction hypotheses required in practice, which often involve syntactic closure
conditions on classes of processes, are not expressible in the modal µ-calculus.
In his MSc dissertation [4], Beattie showed that by moving to a first-order
µ-calculus, including processes as terms, such induction and coinduction rules
can be used to prove interesting properties, including useful parametrized ver-
ification goals. However, there are two drawbacks to this approach. First, the
proofs using induction and coinduction turn out to be long and awkward. Sec-
ond, moving to a first-order logic with process terms amounts to a paradigm
shift from an endogenous logic to an exogenous logic, in the sense of Pnueli [19].
In endogenous logics, such as Hennessy-Milner logic and the modal µ-calculus,
the language of properties (logical formulas) is independent of the language
of programs (process terms). One would like proof systems for such logics to
maintain this desirable separation.
The second approach to including fixed-points in the logics is to adopt a
tableau-based approach to derivations, influenced by local model checking [26].
Under this approach, one simply includes unfolding rules for fixed points, e.g.
Γ, p :A[νX.A/X] =⇒ ∆
Γ, p : νX.A =⇒ ∆
Γ =⇒ p :A[νX.A/X], ∆
Γ =⇒ p : νX.A, ∆
The power of the method is achieved by identifying global combinatorial dis-
charge conditions on derivation trees, involving repetitions of sequents, that
suffice for the concluding sequent of a derivation to be valid. Such conditions
do not require every leaf of the derivation tree to be an axiom.
The adaptation of such tableau-based techniques to sequent calculus including
cut (required for compositionality) is nontrivial. Addressing this problem has
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been a main concern of Dam [7,8,11]. In [11], Dam and Gurov suggest extend-
ing the modal µ-calculus with primitives for explicit approximants of fixed
points, implemented by adding ordinal variables to the syntax. This approach
has led to an elegant characterization of sound discharge conditions in terms
of Bu¨chi automata over derivation trees [24]. In related work, Scho¨pp and I
have shown that explicit approximants can also be expressed using a propo-
sitional extension of the modal µ-calculus with modalities for approximant
modification [21,22]. These various extensions of the µ-calculus with explicit
approximants all retain the desirable property of being endogenous logics.
When a proof system is formulated for an expressive temporal logic, such as
the modal µ-calculus, there is no hope of achieving a general completeness
theorem, even for basic sequents of the form =⇒ p :A with p a closed pro-
cess. Indeed, whenever the model checking problem, of whether p  A holds,
is undecidable, completeness cannot hold for any proof system in which deriv-
able assertions are recursively enumerable, because one would then be able
to decide p  A via semidecision procedures for ` p :A and ` p :¬A. Such
undecidability, and hence incompleteness, results apply even to the simplest
process algebras containing parallel and recursion, such as BPP [12].
Because unqualified completeness results are unavailable, one instead seeks
restricted completeness results for cases in which such results are, at least,
achievable in theory. Sequent calculus has proved a successful platform for
obtaining such results. The results of the present paper deal comprehensively
with the case in which the logic is restricted to Hennessy-Milner logic. For the
modal µ-calculus, sequent-based proof systems based on tableau-style unfold-
ing have yielded several restricted completeness theorems. By a reduction to
Walukiewicz’ completeness theorem for Kozen’s axiomatization of µ-calculus
validity [29], Dam and Gurov established completeness for sequents of the form
=⇒ x :A [11]. Also, Dam showed that tableau-based methods yield complete-
ness for the model checking problem for finite state processes [7,8]. Recently,
Scho¨pp and I have extended this latter result to important classes of infinite
state processes: context-free processes [20,21] and pushdown processes [22].
Of equal importance to such theoretical completeness results is the question
of practical completeness : does a proof system suffice to establish the veri-
fication goals needed in practice? The only way to investigate this question
is by means of case studies. Such case studies have been carried out within
adaptations of the sequent-based proof system to richer process languages and
other computational paradigms. For example, related proof systems have been
developed for the pi-calculus [9,6], Erlang [10,13] and JavaCard [3]. As well as
demonstrating the adaptability of the methods of the present paper, this ac-
cumulating body of work does seem to confirm that sequent-based reasoning
is a viable approach to the formal verification of programs.
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